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SUMMARY 
Excessive flightcrew fatigue as a result of trip exposure has long been cited 
as a factor with potentially serious safety consequences. Laboratory studies have 
implicated fatigue as a causal factor associated with varying levels of performance 
deterioration depending on the amount of fatigue and the type of measure 
utilized in assessing performance. From an operational standpoint, these studies 
have been of limited utility because of the difficulty of generalizing laboratory 
task  performance to the demands associated with the operation of a complex 
aircraft. 
This study examined the performance of 20 volunteer twin-jet transport 
crews in a full-mission simulator scenario that included most aspects of an actual 
line operation. The scenario included both routine flight operations and an 
unexpected mechanical abnormality which resulted in a high level of crew 
workload. Half of the crews flew the simulation within two to three hours after 
completing a three-day, high-density, short-haul duty cycle (Post-Duty 
condition). The other half of the crews flew the scenario after a minimum of 
three days off duty (Pre-Duty condition). 
The results of this study revealed that, not surprisingly, Post-Duty crews 
were significantly more fatigued than PreDuty crews. However, a somewhat 
counter-intuitive pattern of results emerged on the crew performance measures. 
In general, the performance of Post-Duty crews was significantly better than the 
performance of Pre-Duty crews. Post-Dhty crews were rated as performing 
better by an expert observer on a number of dimensions relevant to flight safety. 
Analyses of the flightcrew communication patterns revealed that Post-Duty crews 
communicated significantly more overall, suggesting, as has previous research, 
that communication is a good predictor of overall crew performance. 
Further analyses suggested that the primary cause of this pattern of results 
is the fact that crewmembers usually have more operating experience together at 
the end of a trip, and that this recent operating experience serves to facilitate 
crew coordination, which can be an effective countermeasure to the fatigue 
present at or near the end of a duty cycle. These results have important aircrew 
training and aviation safety implications. 
V 
INTRODUCTION 
1 . l .  Background 
This report is the third in a series on the physiological and psychological 
effects of flight operations on flightcrews and the operational significance of these 
effects. These studies were conducted in response to a Congressional request. 
The original response to this request was a workshop convened by the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and held at  the Ames Research 
Center (ARC) in August, 1980. This workshop included representatives from the 
scientific community, airline pilots, and management; its expressed purpose was 
to make recommendations regarding the type of research necessary to understand 
the extent of the problem. 
One of the conclusions reached at this workshop was that little was known 
about the effects of exposure to duty cycles on actual flight performance. Despite 
impressive advances in aircraft technology over the past several decades and an 
overall decline in the accident rate since the introduction of turbine-powered 
aircraft, flightcrew performance problems continue to dominate the statistics. 
There are, of course, many hypotheses concerning the persistence of operator 
performance problems in this environment, and the issue of pilot fatigue has 
traditionally received considerable attention. This high level of interest has 
stimulated a large volume of laboratory research, but much of this work is 
difficult to generalize to the actual operations, and the issues surrounding its 
applicability have prompted considerable disagreement about the extent and 
operational significance of fatigue-related performance decrements. As a result, 
NASA was asked to undertake a comprehensive program of research in order to 
assess whether or not fatigue-related problems are prevalent in long- and short- 
haul flight operations. The two major facets of this project are 1) to assess the 
psychophysiological effect of exposure to various types of flight and duty cycles 
and 2) to determine the operational significance of this exposure in terms of flight 
safety and efficiency. This project also sought to identify individual pilot 
attributes that might be associated with responses to the operational 
requirements of air transport flying and to identify adaptive strategies that might 
enable certain individuals to  cope more effectively with operational requirements. 
This is the second report in the short-haul series. It describes one aspect of 
this comprehensive program, the results of a study designed to address the 
operational significance question in short-haul flight operations (see Gander, 
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Graeber, Foushee, & Lauber, 1986; for a discussion of the psychophysiological 
effects). In addition, a brief overview of research aimed at fatigue-performance 
relationships is provided. 
1.2. Related Research 
Aside from research focusing on cockpit design and engineering issues, there 
have been relatively few pilot performance studies carried out in actual 
operational environments (see Graeber, Foushee, and Lauber, 1984; for a more 
comprehensive discussion). The reasons for this state of affairs are varied. Field 
research is very difficult to do because of an almost complete lack of experimental 
control over operational events. Moreover, flight safety considerations prohibit 
the examination of many variables in the in-flight environment. Thus, studies 
aimed at the effects of fatigue on performance have generally been confined to 
laboratory or part-task research environments and have focused upon individual 
instead of flightcrew performance. 
Holding (1983) reviewed many of these studies and much of the related 
literature on fatigue-task performance relationships. One of the major conclusions 
of this review and others (e.g. Gagne, 1953) is that fatigue-performance 
relationships are not easy to  define. The literature is populated by many studies 
demonstrating a deleterious effect of fatigue on some type of task performance, 
and about an equal number demonstrating minimal or no effects. Those tasks 
that do show deterioration over time (presumably as a response to some type of 
fatigue) tend to be relatively simple tasks characterized by repetitive stimulation. 
The pattern of findings for more complex tasks is less clear. 
The work of Bartlett (1943) is commonly cited as one of the major 
contributions to the literature on complex task fatigue. In this body of work 
(often referred to as the Cambridge Cockpit Studies), subjects were exposed to 
tasks which consisted of responding on aircraft-type controls to  %changes" in a 
variety of instruments. Fatigue was manipulated by exposure to these tasks over 
long periods of time. The findings of these studies seemed to indicate that as 
alertness declined, progressively larger "deviations" were tolerated before any 
corrective actions were taken by subjects. It appeared that Yatigued" subjects 
were more prone to distraction and seemed to suffer from a narrowing of 
perceptual focus such that attention was reserved for items of more central 
importance, such as heading and speed indicators. It was further observed that 
performance on these tasks became more variable (as opposed to less accurate). 
Moreover, subjective observations indicated that subjects became more irritable 
with increasing fatigue ("violent" language, etc.). 
On the other hand, McFarland (1953), in a study of aircraft incident and 
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accident statistics, could find no effect for the fatigue associated with long hours 
of flying (although accidents are a crude measure of pilot performance). 
Likewise, Chiles (1955) could find no fatigue effect even though subjects 
performed continuously in an aircraft simulator for as long as 56 hr without rest, 
except for intervals where they left the simulator for testing on a tracking task. 
It is reported that some of Chiles' test subjects had to be carried to the test 
apparatus, and the absence of performance effects associated with fatigue under 
these circumstances is indeed striking. However, aircraft flying performance was 
not directly measured--the primary performance criterion was associated with the 
tracking task. Despite what would appear to be high levels of fatigue in this 
study, performance on this task was well within normal limits. 
Studies of automobile driving have yielded similar inconsistent results. 
Brown (1967) found no performance effects associated with fatigue and found 
that performance on a vigilance task actually improved over time (when fatigue 
effects should have begun to appear). In a particularly interesting study, 
Dureman and Boden (1972) found some evidence of performance deterioration on 
a simulated driving task (as measured by steering errors and braking reactions). 
However, when subjects were threatened with electric shock, a factor which 
apparently increased arousal, performance improved. These data suggest that 
arousal and accompanying increases in motivation may be important mediators of 
fat igue-performance relationships. 
It is difficult to summarize the implications of the fatigue-performance 
literature for air transport operations because most of the studies have not been 
conducted in actual flight environments, or the tasks have not been relevant to  
the task of flying a complex transport aircraft. Even the studies that have 
utilized tasks with some face-validity to piloting an aircraft (e.g. Bartlett, 1943) 
were crude simulations by recent standards, and the primary performance criteria 
were relatively simple monitoring or vigilance tasks that did not comprise the 
entire performance spectrum. Another problem with previous studies is the 
manipulation of fatigue. Most studies have artificially manipulated fatigue by 
keeping subjects up, exposing subjects to long and continuous performance 
periods, or testing subjects after rigorous physical exercise. Few studies have 
coupled consistent manipulations of fatigue with comparable performance 
measures, which makes comparisons across studies hazardous at best. Even fewer 
studies have utilized ezposure to normal duty cycles as a means of inducing 
fatigue, causing further difficulties in generalizing laboratory evaluations of 
fatigue effects to  real-world settings. 
Those studies that have examined performance as a result of actual exposure 
to flight operations (as opposed to  more artificial manipulations of fatigue) have 
generally not utilized actual flight performance measures for assessment of effects 
(for reviews of this research see Klein and Wegman, 1980; Graeber, 1982) The 
usual approach has been to  measure subjects' performance after exposure to 
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transmeridian flight (usually as passengers) on a batt,ery of laboratory tests of 
psychomotor and simple cognitive performance. Only one study has measured 
performance in flight simulators using experienced pilots (Klein, Bruner. 
Holtmann, Rehme, Stolze, Steinhoff, and Wegmann, 1970). In this study. 
subjects were tested periodically after exposure to successive trips eastward and 
westward across eight time zones. Performance was measured by percent 
deviation from preset flight parameters, and exhibited significant deficits 
depending on such factors as time of testing, direction of flight, and number of 
days in the new time zone. While this is one of the few studies to demonstrate a 
potentially operationally significant effect of circadian dysrhythmia on 
performance, it left many questions unanswered. The measures utilized represent 
only an estimate of the effects of fatigue and jet-lag on raw flying skill and do not 
address other important predictors of performance in actual operations. The 
simulator tests lasted only 12 min, were limited to manual control skills, and did 
not tap any of the higher level cognitive skills required on the flight deck. 
Furthermore, the study examined a single-pilot operation. In multi-pilot 
operations there are a number of other factors that affect flight safety and 
efficiency. 
Coupled with the problems of understanding fatigue effects on individual 
performance tasks is the increasing realization that individual pilot proficiency 
and the manual control skills necessary to operate a complex transport aircraft 
are clearly important, but not causal factors in the majority of incidents and 
accidents. An analysis of jet-transport accidents worldwide for the period 1968 to 
1976 (Cooper, White, and Lauber, 1979) revealed more than 60 in which 
breakdowns of the crew performance and decision-making process played a 
pivotal role. Much of the aviation community seems to have accepted the notion 
that inadequate crew coordination, team performance, and the myriad variables 
that contribute to such difficulties are perhaps the most operationally significant 
problem areas in flight operations. Recommendations by the National 
Transportation Safety Board and the number of commercial and military training 
programs being developed to address "cockpit resource management" problems 
reflect this high level of acceptance. These attempts to address crew performance 
issues are in large part predicated on the notion that individuals will always 
make mistakes, and the crew should act as a system of redundancy to prevent 
more serious errors from occurring. There is a fair amount of research evidence 
(for a review see Foushee & Helmreich, 1986 in press) that the crew performance 
process is not working as well as it should be. 
Pilots who are highly proficient in manual control skills continue to be 
involved in incidents and accidents with causes that fall outside the realm of the 
operators' psychomotor abilities. Yet, nearly all pilot performance research (and 
training) is centered around the measurement of dimensions that do not appear 
to be major problem areas in the current environment. No studies have examined 
the possible effects of fatigue upon higher-level decision-making skills and those 
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related to effective coordination of crew resources. Holding (1983) cites this 
failure to use measures of higher-order cognitive function, but he also mentions 
neglect in accounting for relatively stable effects of fatigue such as increased 
irritability. For example, the increased irrit.ability associated with fatigue (e.g., 
Bartlett, 1943) could make it more difficult for crewmembers to work together 
effectively. Thus, fatigue effects may not be apparent on individual performance 
parameters, but significant with respect to group performance. 
In the past, the major barrier to definitive research in all of these areas has 
been the lack of a research environment that combines experimental control with 
high generalizability to  operations. Fortunately, the rapid advancement of 
simulator technology has finally provided an ideal laboratory for the study of 
these aircrew operating problems. It is now feasible to realistically simulate 
virtually every aspect of line operations to the extent that actual trips can be 
flown in a simulator that are almost indistinguishable from those in the airplane. 
Because of this high degree of realism, it is possible to study individual and group 
parameters with almost complete confidence that results generated in the 
simulator are representative of the real world. Moreover, the simulator affords a 
high degree of experimental control and allows the study of operational problems 
too dangerous to examine in flight. It is clear that arousal levels associated with 
realistic simulated flight more closely approximate those experienced in actual 
flight (at least when compared to laboratory performance tasks). In fact, Ruffell 
Smith (1979) reports arousal levels in high-fidelity simulation that closely 
approximating levels measured in flight. 
With these issues in mind, our objectives were to conduct an investigation of 
the effects of exposure to high-density, short-haul airline operations that would 
be highly generalizable to the operational environment. Specifically, we were 
interested in whether there were any behavioral or performance changes 
associated with typical short-haul duty cycles, but more importantly, we were 
interested in whether these behavioral and performance changes (if any) were 
operationally significant. For the purpose of this investigation, operational 
significance was defined as performance that has a major bearing on flight safety 
and efficiency. Unlike the majority of previous research efforts, this study sought 
to measure performance on a realistic group performance task that induced high 
motivation and arousal. The task was also oriented toward complex decision- 
making skills rather than simple, repetitive tasks involving manual control skills. 
METHOD 
2.1. Stu.dy Design Overview 
Since the primary objective of this study was to assess the operational 
significance of exposure to various types of flight and duty cycles, subject crews 
were evaluated either before or after they had completed a three-day trip. The 
!'target trips" in this study consisted of high-density short-haul airline operations 
averaging eight hr of on-duty time per day and five takeoffs and landings, with at 
least one day (usually the last) averaging close to eight takeoffs and landings and 
thirteen hr on duty. There were two experimental conditions. 1) Subjects in the 
Vost-Duty" condition flew the simulation as if it were the last segment of a 
three-day trip, whereas 2) subjects in the l'Pre-Dutyll condition flew the 
simulation after a minimum of two days off duty (usually three), as if it were the 
first segment of a trip. Twenty volunteer crews were run in the study (40 pilots). 
One Post-Duty crew was eliminated from all analyses, when it was ascertained 
that the captain had been informed about the operational events associated with 
the scenario. This left 11 crews in the Pre-Duty condition and 9 crews in the 
Post-Duty condition. 
2.2. Subjects and Recruitment 
All subjects were recruited from the ranks of active line pilots in one 
domicile of a major U. S. air carrier. The decision to use pilots from one carrier 
was necessitated by differences in standard operating procedures and aircraft 
configurations that are common across air carriers. Thus, for experimental 
control purposes and to maintain the highest possible degree of realism, the 
scenario was designed to simulate precisely this particular airline's operation. All 
of the subject pilots were currently flying the transport aircraft used for the 
simulation exclusively in line operat ions. 
Both airline management and union officials were contacted and briefed 
about the purpose of this investigation. When approval was received from both, 
all pilots in this domicile were sent a brochure describing the purpose of the 
project and providing information about the extent and type of participation 
requested from volunteer subjects. 
Recruitment was based on several factors. Every month, the investigators 
received a copy of the trip pairings (which crewmembers are flying what trips) 
from crew scheduling. From these pairings it was possible to determine which 
crewmembers were flying and when, as well as, those crewmembers with days off 
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during any given period. The pairings were examined to determine which trips fit 
the criteria for the study (see Gander et al., 1986 for a thorough discussion of trip 
characteristics). In general, tsrget trip selection was based upon such factors as 
the number of segments flown in a day, duration of the duty day, and length of 
nighttime layover. The most difficult duty cycles for this aircraft type were 
selected each month, and were characterized by a high number of takeoffs and 
landings, long duty days, and the shortest overnight layovers. 
When these trips were identified, the pilots scheduled to fly them were 
contacted by telephone (if they had not previously participated in the simulator 
study) and recruited for assignment to the Post-Duty condition. They were 
scheduled for participation within two to three hr after completion of their duty 
cycle. 
The subjects for the Pre-Duty condition were contacted if the trip pairings 
indicated that they were scheduled to be off duty for a period of at least three 
days. Due to the nature of trip pairings in this airline (and in short-haul 
operations in general), this is a relatively long continuous period off duty, with 
the exception of vacation time which is at the discretion of the pilot. Although all 
Pre-Duty subjects were scheduled for the simulation after it was ascertained that 
they would have three continuous off-duty days, 3 out of the 22 subjects in this 
condition had only two off-duty days. This occurred because of unscheduled 
extensions of prior trips that were usually the result of aircraft or weather 
difficulties forcing alterations of the scheduled pattern. This could not be 
determined until those involved in schedule alterations had arrived for the 
simulation experiment. 
When contacted by telephone, all potential subjects were briefed on the 
details of the experiment by the principal investigator. This briefing included the 
purpose of the simulation study and what was expected from each volunteer 
subject. All of the subjects were informed that the simulation would be 
conducted exactly as if it were an actual flight, and crews were aware that the 
flight was a GSO-RIC segment, but they were not informed of any other details 
of the simulation scenario. 
After obtaining tentative agreement to participate from prospective subjects, 
a considerable amount of effort was spent explaining the level of experimental 
realism so that the subject pilots would begin to think of the simulation as '3ust 
another flight segment." All pilots were asked to  bring their own headsets, flight 
bags, including all charts and manuals, and anything else they normally take 
along during line operations. 
Although subjects in this study (or any other part of the project) received no 
compensation for their participation, approximately 60% of pilots contacted 
agreed to  participate in the experiment. The refusal rate was higher than in the 
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Gander et al. (field) study (15%), and most likely reflected the fact that 
participation would have caused considerable personal inconvenience. The 
highest refusal rate was among commuters not living nearby the simulator facility 
and crew domicile. since participation by many of these iridividuals would have 
caused them to remain away from home for an extra night. Field study 
participation, although requiring more overall time, did not entail any alteration 
of an individual’s normal schedule. Of the pilots contacted, who resided within 
two hr of the simulation facility, the participation rate was above 90%. 
Because of the sensitivity of pilot-performance data in general and the focus 
upon operational significance in this investigation, it was rlecessary to guarantee 
all pilots participating in this study complete confidentiality. This was done in 
several ways. First, all data in this study were identified by a four-digit code 
l?. 3. Cortfidentiality 
2.4. Ezperimental Equipment 
The simulator that was utilized for this study had a sk-degtee-of-freedom 
motion platform and four-wihdow visual system. It was manufactured by CAE, 
Inc. of Canada, was equipped with the special effects and programmed with the 
aircraft performance data required to  meet FAA Phase I1 certification, and had 
successfully completed the certification process. 
Only minor simulator modifrcations were necessary for the experiment. 
These included the provision of input jacks so that background air traffic control 
(ATC) communications and the Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS) 
recordings for the various airports could be fed into the VHF radios no. 1 and no. 
2. All equipment that was not functional in the simulator, such the weather 
radar (the scope was present but not functional), the Automated 
Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS), and the VHF no. 
3 radio (present but not functional) was placarded as inoperative just as they 
would have been in the actual line operation. It was also necessary to  develop 
software so that the simulator computer would output time-coded aircraft 
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performance parameters. 
A portable video-data-acquisition-system (PI'DAS) was designed and built 
by NASA for the purpose of this investigation. The advantages of t h k  system 
are that it is pre-wired, and all components are mounted in a shock-proof case 
that can be rolled into the simulator cab and set up quickly. All of the simulator 
sessions were videotaped using PVDAS which included a two-channel, one-half 
inch VHS videotape recorder, monitor, camera, microphones, time-code 
generator, and three microcassette recorders. Both crewmembers and the air 
traffic controller were wired with lapel microphones; the captain on channel one 
and the first officer and controller on channel two. A single low-light, auto-iris, 
black-and-white, video camera was located above and behind both crewmembers 
at the approximate location of the cockpit door. This camera angle allowed a 
view of the center console, the throttle quadrant, and most of the instrument 
panel, with the exception of the overhead panel. About one-half of each pilot 
was visible, which allowed most actions to be monitored, but did not allow 
individual pilots to be identified. The time-code generator was used to 
synchronize the videotapes with the aircraft performance data and imprint a 
permanent record of timing information on each videotape. The microcassette 
recorders were also prewired and plugged into jacks mounted inside the simulator 
cab, which fed the VHF no. 1 and no. 2 radios. Each recorder was wired to 
switches so that any tape in any recorder could be fed into either radio. In this 
way, it was possible to provide all ATC background communications and ATIS 
information as appropriate depending on which radio was being utilized by the 
crewmembers. In this system, transmissions from the 'live" controller blocked 
out the ATC background communications, but it was usually convenient for the 
controller to  time instructions to  the flightcrew accordingly. 
Background ATC tapes were produced with the cooperation of each ATC 
facility that the pilots would be in contact with in the area of the simulated 
flight. These included GSO Ground Control, GSO Tower, GSO Departure, RIC 
Approach, RIC Tower, RIC Departure, ROA Approach, and ROA Tower. Each 
facility supervisor taped approximately 1 hr and 30 min of actual transmissions 
during a busy traffic period. The tapes were then edited for inconsistent 
information and normal pacing to produce a suitable amount of material for the 
simulated flight. Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center (ARTCC) tapes 
were produced by the investigators in the Man-Vehicle Systems Research Facility 
(MVSRF) air traffic control simulation at ARC using the voice-disguising 
equipment to simulate different aircraft in contact with Washington Center. 
These tapes of background communications were quite effective in producing a 
high level of operational realism. 
Tapes for ATIS were produced by the investigators using ~ O - S ~ C ,  
continuous-loop, microcassette tapes. The tapes were mounted well in advance of 
the flight's approach to the appropriate facility and could be monitored at any 
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t8ime and for any period because of the continuous-play feature. 
produced for each of the airports used in the experiment. GSO, RIC, and ROA. 
Tapes were 
2.5. Personnel 
I The experiment was run with three staff members. The principal 
investigator dealt with the subject pilots, coordinated the data collection, and 
made decisions regarding the handling of flightcrew requests. He also acted as 
the number one flight attendant if requested by crewmembers. A second person 
delivered all air traffic control communications to the flightcrew and operated the 
simulator, including the introduction of scenario events. The third person was a 
retired check captain in the aircraft simulated. His role was primarily 
performance observation (see section 2.10), but because of his familiarity with 
company operations, also served as a technical adviser to facilitate operational 
realism. All three members of the experimental staff were present in the 
simulator during each run, but were out of the flightcrew's field of vision. 
Flightcrew members were informed that there would be no intervention by any of 
the experimental staff and that they should request all information through 
normal channels. They were advised that if simulator malfunctions caused 
unplanned events, they would be informed of the appropriate action. Once 
"airborne", intervention was necessary in only one case, when a simulator 
malfunction forced an early termination of the experiment approximately 10 min 
prior to touchdown at ROA. All data were used up until the time of the 
malfunction. The only exception to the non-intervention rule was that crews 
usually needed help during taxi operations because of poor visibility conditions 
and a lack of complete fidelity in the GSO ground scene (taxiway lights were 
low-intensity) . 
~ 
2.6. Experimental Procedure 
When each crew arrived at the simulation facility, they were met by the 
principal investigator who again briefed the subjects on the purpose of the 
investigation. The importance of operational realism was again emphasized, and 
the pilots were urged to treat the simulation as if it were an actual flight. They 
were informed that they would have access to all resources that they would 
normally have in-flight, including complete ATC services, dispatch, access to 
maintenance, ATIS, and so on. However, no details were provided to flightcrews 
other than the flight's origin and destination. Subjects were asked to treat the 
flight as a 'kaptain's segment", captain flying the aircraft and first officers 
performing support duties. This was done for experimental-control purposes and 
to assure consistent performance evaluation at both crew positions. After any 
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questions were handled, the flightcrew was escorted to a room set up as a flight 
dispatch facility, where they met with the flight dispatcher (played by the 
observer). The flight dispatcher provided the crews with the same information 
and paperwork that they would have normally received prior to a trip. This 
information included the route of flight, weather information for the vicinity of 
flight, fuel information, weight and balance information, number of passengers, 
and so on. All information was provided on standard company forms. 
Following receipt of these materials, the crews performed flight planning 
duties normally reserved for this period. The dispatcher remained available to 
render any assistance the flightcrew might have requested. Crews were given a 
standard departure time based on their arrival at the simulator facility and were 
given adequate time for flight planning activities. After the flight planning 
phase, crews entered the simulator cab, were wired with microphones, and began 
preflight checks of the aircraft. 
When it appeared that the crew was nearing completion of preflight checks 
and as departure time approached, the simulator operator extinguished the "aft 
cargo door light," prompting most flightcrews to realize the aircraft was loaded 
and ready. Shortly thereafter, the captain was called over the interphone by 
ground personnel and informed that the aircraft was ready. At this point, most 
crewmembers radioed for a clearance to pushback from the gate. Push-back was 
simulated by activating the simulator motion platform at the appropriate 
moment, which produced a small jolt quite similar to  that associated with the tug 
beginning to push the aircraft backward. The recording of performance data 
began at push-back (see section 2.10.3). Taxi and ground operations were 
accomplished in accordance with standard operating procedures, as was the 
remainder of the simulated flight (the details of the scenario are discussed in 
section 2.7). 
After landing, the crews were escorted back to the flight dispatch area where 
they filled out a number of rating forms (see sections 2.8-2.10). They were then 
debriefed by the principal investigator. In many cases, this was a rather extensive 
process since pilots were often anxious to discuss various events and actions taken 
during the simulated flight. Subject pilots were then thanked for their 
participation and received a lengthy explanation from the principal investigator 
concerning the importance of not discussing the details of the scenario with any 
other pilots (who might have later been experimental subjects). The initial 
briefings (when subjects first arrived at the facility) indicated that this procedure 
was quite successful. Only one captain (see section 2.1) was apparently aware of 
some of the scenario events. This was confirmed by initial questioning and later 
behavior during the simulated flight, and this crew was dropped from all 
analyses. All subjects were promised copies of the results when they became 
available. 
1 1  
2.7. Simulation Scenario 
The experimental scenario was designed primarily to assess factors related to 
overall crew performance and decision-making. It was not intended to be a test 
of manual control skills, although data pertinent to these skills were available so 
that they could be assessed in certain critical flight phases. The scenario design 
was influenced by a pattern of events often seen in past incidents and accidents-- 
relatively minor mechanical problems complicated by environmental and 
operational events. 
Outlines of potential scenarios were developed by the NASA investigators 
and taken to the participating airline where specific details were developed in 
conjunction with subject-matter experts. For this purpose, the experts were two 
retired company management pilots were hired for assistance in standardizing 
scenario events to company operating procedures. Typical environmental 
conditions for the proposed area of flight were considered in great detail, so that 
scenario events relating to these conditions would be realistic to the experimental 
flightcrews. The experts also prepared all trip paperwork in standard company 
format and evaluated all events and procedures for accuracy and realism. 
Following this process, nine "pretest" runs were conducted with qualified 
flightcrews to refine procedures, train the experimental staff, evaluate the 
performance assessment techniques, and test scenario events. Feedback was 
elicited from pretest subjects, and the videotapes were extensively evaluated. 
This process allowed continual refinement until the experimental scenario was 
finalized. 
When crews arrived at the simulation facility and picked up the trip 
paperwork, they found the weather information for the vicinity of flight 
characterized by a frontal system passing through with low ceilings and 
visibilities (see Figure 1). This included the departure airport, which was still 
acceptable for takeoff but nearing the legal limit (RVR 1600, 1/4 mi). The 
airplane was relatively heavy, and the takeoff was runway-limited because the 
longer runway at the departure airport (GSO) was closed. Aircraft gross weight 
was 104,000 lb. Since weight was critical, it was dispatched with a minimum, 
but legal amount of fuel (13,200 lb). Because of this and the poor weather, which 
increased the probability of diversion, crews should have been concerned about 
the amount of fuel (possibility of extra fuel needed for a diversion), and as in the 
real world, crews had the option of requesting additional fuel from the flight 
dispatcher. This, of course, had implications for aircraft weight, and if more fuel 
was requested (prudent under the circumstances), baggage had to be off-loaded. 
The dispatcher was instructed to explain the implications of extra fuel to 
flightcrews and otherwise act reluctant to provide the extra fuel (as is sometimes 
the case). However, if the flightcrew could not be persuaded to go with the legal 
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minimum, the dispatcher agreed to add 5,000 lb extra fuel. Eighteen out of the 
twenty crews asked for and received this extra amount. 
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Figure 1. Overview of the simulation scenario (WX=weather, X-wind=crosswind) 
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After the crew had preflighted the aircraft and received clearance to push- 
back and taxi, ATC issued a special weather observation to all aircraft in the 
vicinity indicating that the weather had deteriorated (RVR 1600, 1/8 mi, rain 
and fog). The operational implications were tha t  takeoff was still legal, but 
landing was not, and this meant crews were legally required to obtain a takeoff 
alternate, in case mechanical problems forced a quick return for landing. If a 
takeoff alternate was requested, ROA was provided by dispatch since it had the 
best weather within a relatively short distance from GSO. ROA was also given 
as the regular alternate landing site for RIC (as will be seen later, ROA was 
selected intentionally because of certain characteristics and because it was the 
site where all flightcrews were ultimately forced to land). As in all of the 
operational events 'brogrammed" into the simulation, some crews realized this 
necessity and acted appropriately, while some did not. Once airborne, a 
relatively low-activity, routine segment was planned in order to allow crews to 
relax so that their behavior would more closely approximate actual flight 
behavior. This procedure has been found to be effective in both training and 
research applications of full-mission simulation (e.g. Lauber & Foushee, 1981). 
For this reason, most of the performance measures were taken after the end of 
this routine segment. 
A few minor events were inserted in the low-workload segment as measures 
of crew vigilance. These included icing conditions (to make sure crews were 
paying attention to environmental conditions and utilized the anti-ice system 
when necessary) and unexpected rain and moderate turbulence along the route of 
flight. The aircraft was dispatched with the weather radar inoperative, and 
'%vigilantff crews would have checked with ATC for ground-based radar advisories 
or pilot reports (Pireps) to  assure sufficient separation from potential severe 
weather. Evaluation of crew awareness of such events was included in both 
observer-rating dimensions and in the error analyses. 
The 'high-workload" phase of flight was initiated when crews began their 
approach to the destination airport. When they received standard weather 
information for the arrival (via RIC ATIS), they discovered that the weather was 
poor and required a complicated, instrument approach (RVR 1200, Category I1 
approaches to runway 33 in progress). Furthermore, there was a substantial 
crosswind on the active runway, and which was close to the legal limit (winds 
from 230 degrees at 9 knots). As the crews continued their approaches and 
contacted the tower for landing clearance, they were advised by the RIC Tower 
that the winds had increased to 13 knots from 230 degrees, which was 3 knots 
over the legal limit of a 10-knot crosswind component for a Category I1 approach. 
Some crews realized this and executed the required missed approach, and some 
did not. In any event, all crews, whether or not they realized that landing was 
illegal, were forced to execute a missed approach because those who continued 
the approach to RIC did not have visual contact with the ground at the decision 
height of 103 f t  above the surface. During the missed approach, crews 
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experienced a "System A" hydraulic failure. The implications of this malfunction 
were complex: 1) landing gear and flaps had to be extended manually; 2) 
braking effectiveness was reduced, which meant. increased stopping distances (the 
in-board brakes anti-skid system and thrust reversers had accumulator pressure 
only): 3) a 15-degree flaps approach was dictated when 30 to 40 degrees is the 
norm (15-degree limit is imposed in case a missed approach is necessary); 4) once 
the landing gear was extended manually, it could not be raised again (which has 
substantial implications for fuel consumption and subsequent missed approaches); 
and 5 )  nosewheel steering was inoperative (which meant that the aircraft would 
have to be towed off the runway. 
Crews were then facedewith a number of complicated decisions to make and 
procedures to execute. They had to decide where they were going to land, since 
the original destination did not have legal landing conditions, and in some cases 
there was only a limited amount of fuel (recall the original dispatch with 
minimum fuel). They had to diagnose the failure, realize the implications, and 
secure the failed system. Since higher approach speeds and reduced braking 
effectiveness were primary problems, it was clear that the most desirable 
alternate landing site was one with a relatively long runway. 
The operational problems induced by the hydraulic failure were more severe 
than they normally would have been because of poor weather in the general 
vicinity (this was consistent with the initial weather briefing that crews received 
in dispatch prior to the flight) and limited fuel. The airports that should have 
been considered as alternates included TRI, IAD, DCA, RDU, CLT, and GSO, 
but all had visibilities of 1/4 mi or less, and some were closed due to weather 
conditions. The only reasonable alternate was an airport (ROA) with acceptable 
weather, but a with a relatively short runway (runway 33 at 5800 ft)  that was 
wet, sloping downhill, and adjacent to mountainous terrain. ROA had a 1000-ft 
ceiling, 5 mi visibility, and winds from 360 degrees at 10 knots. The relatively 
good ROA weather was not surprising to most flight crews, who were familiar 
with the fact that it is an area frequently characterized by favorable conditions 
when other airports are marginal. Although the relatively short runway and 
mountainous terrain posed a dilemma for many flightcrews, it was the best choice 
compared to the other possible alternates. 
Another feature of the scenario was that the manual-gear and flap-extension 
procedures were time-consuming and required a fair amount of pre-planning. 
Moreover, the flight time from RIC to ROA was relatively short (approximately 
30 min), so time had to be apportioned carefully. In short, this simulation 
required a high level of crew coordination for effective performance--a good test of 
high-level decision-making and crew performance. It should again be stressed that 
some of the features of this scenario are similar to those seen in past incidents 
and accidents. 
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2.8. Demographic Data 
Each subject pilot was asked to complete an extensive background 
questionnaire compiled to obtain information on demographic and lifestyle 
variables such as sleep, nutritional habits, and personality profiles related to pilot 
performance. (see Gander et al., 1986; for a more complete discussion). While 
many of these variables were intended for use in the physiological investigation, it 
was necessary to obtain this information in this study in order to assure that 
subjects in each condition were matched on variables such as age, general health, 
and experience. However, the relatively small sample size did not allow extensive 
analyses of performance as a function of these variables. 
I 2.9. Fatigue Measures 
Subject perceptions of fatigue were assessed utilizing the same techniques 
that were developed for use in the field study (see Gander et ai., 1986; for a 
detailed discussion of these measures). Immediately after the simulation, subjects 
reported their sleep-wake schedules for each of the four previous nights. They 
were also asked to rate the quality of their previous night's sleep on four 
dimensions: difficulty falling asleep, deepness of sleep, difficulty arising, and how 
restful the sleep was. In addition, subjects completed a 26-item mood adjective 
checklist (e.g., Moses, Lubin, Naitoh, & Johnson, 1974) and estimated their level 
of fatigue by placing a mark on a 10 cm. line representing a continuum from 
most alert to most drowsy (e.g., Wever, 1979). All of these measures were taken 
from the 'Daily Log Book" (see Gander, et al., 1986) used in the field 
investigation, and are shown in Appendix D. 
2.10. Crew Performance Measures 
A variety of measures were utilized in an effort to  assess the performance of 
flight crews in this simulation study. These measures were aimed at  the 
assessment of both individual and crew performance parameters. Since the 
primary objective was to determine whether any observed performance changes 
were operationally significant, a heavy emphasis was placed upon methods 
designed to quantify the crew performance process. As previously discussed 
(section 1.2), the reason for this emphasis was the finding that the vast majority 
of incidents and accidents in air transport operations appear to be due to 
breakdowns in crew performance rather than a lack of individual knowledge and 
skill. 
16 
The crew-performance measures included expert observer ratings, subjective 
assessments of workload, aircraft handling data, error analyses (both real-time 
and videotape), and crew communication patterns. Each will be discussed in 
detail. 
2.10.1. Observer Ratings. Two types of ratings were obtained. First, a 
rating form was developed that was organized into categories relevant to the 
performance dimensions of interest in the test scenario. This instrument can be 
seen in Appendix A. It was partitioned by phase of flight (i.e., preflight, 
taxi/takeoff, climb, cruise, approach/missed approach, emergency 
procedure/hydraulic failure, cruise to alternate, and approach/landing). Within 
each section were the individual dimensions to be rated. The expert observer was 
asked to rate both the captain and the first officer on each dimension as it was 
observed and if it was applicable. Each dimension was scored on a five-point 
Likert scale. Scale anchors were defined as follows: l=below-average 
performance; 2=slightly below-average; 3=average; 4=slightly above-average; and 
5=above-average performance. Many of the dimensions were common to each 
phase of flight (i.e. crew coordination/communications, a/c handling, 
planning/situation awareness, procedures, overall performance, etc.). However, 
some were relevant only to specific flight phases or situations (e.g. thunderstorm 
awareness, stress management, takeoff alternate, etc.). If for some reason the 
category was not observed (not appropriate or the observer was uncertain), the 
observer was instructed to circle the %/at1 response provided with each scale. 
These ratings were made %eal-time" as the simulation progressed. This type of 
rating form was designed as a systematic approach to  the types of performance 
judgements made routinely by supervisory check pilots in training and 
evaluation. Thus, the observer (a retired check-captain) was highly experienced 
in making such ratings. 
The second type of rating (Appendix B) was more general and completed by 
the expert observer immediately after the simulation. It consisted of nine 
categories (overall knowledge of a/c and procedures, technical proficiency, 
'bmoothness," crew coordination and internal communication, external 
communication, motivation, command ability (for captains), vigilance, and 
overall performance). The observer completed this overall form for both captains 
and first officers These ratings were also made on five-point Likert scales (anchors 
defined same as above) and were intended to assess the expert observer's overall 
impression of performance throughout the simulation on each dimension. 
2.1 0.2. Subjective Workload. Pilot perceptions of workload were assessed via 
a technique developed by Hart and coworkers (e.g. Hart, Battiste, & Lester, 
1984). This rating form consists of 10 workload-related dimensions: task 
difficulty, time pressure, performance, mental effort, amount of attention 
required, complexity, busy-ness, motivation, fatigue, and overall workload (see 
Appendix C). Each dimension was scaled on 7-point Likert scales with high 
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numbers indicating larger amounts of the dimension in question. These measures 
have proven useful in assessing subjective levels of pilot workload in a number of 
experimental settings. 
2.10.3. Aircraft Handling Data. These data were recorded directly from the 
simulator computer. Twelve parameters related to the aircraft configuration and 
handling were sampled every 15 sec. These included: airspeed, altitude, vertical 
speed, magnetic heading, engine # 1 (engine pressure ratio) EPR setting, 
glideslope deviation, localizer deviation, gear position, flap position, # 1 
navigational frequency, and # 1 DME reading, and elapsed time (see Appendix 
F). All measures were time synchronized with the videotaped records so that 
other performance parameters could be examined along with aircraft 
configuration. These measures were utilized primarily for analysis of final 
approach data at ROA and for crosschecking during the error analyses. 
2.10.4. Error Analyses. Error analyses were undertaken using two 
independent sources of data. First, the expert observer kept a record of all errors 
observed during the course of the simulation. The second source of error data 
came from the videotape records. Using these records, two independent, %blind," 
observers reviewed the tapes for operational errors. When an error was 
containing an alleged error was reviewed at least twice by the observers. After 
not counted in the analysis. Both sources of error data (real-time data collected 
during the simulation and data from the videotape analyses) were compared for 
reliability. The video-tape error-coding process captured all errors recorded real- 
time by the expert observer, however, it also revealed others that were missed 
during the course of the experimental runs. This is not surprising considering the 
fact that the videotapes could be endlessly reviewed. Reliability analyses 
revealed 81% agreement between both sources of error information, yielding a 
high level of confidence in these data. 
I 
recognized by one or both observers, the tape was stopped and the segment 
this process, both observers had to agree that the error had occurred or it was I 
I 
Since assessing the operational significance of performance differences was a 
primary objective, an attempt was made to categorize errors according to their 
level of severity. This process was accomplished by both of the observers who 
had undertaken the videotape error-analysis. A three-level classification was 
utilized--Type I errors were defined as minor, with a low probability of serious 
flight safety consequences; Type I1 errors were defined as moderate severity, with 
a stronger potential for flight safety consequences; and Type 111 errors were 
classified as operationally significant errors, those having a direct negative impact 
upon flight safety. 
I Examples of Type I errors include missed clearances that were quickly 
corrected, checklists not run according to standard operating procedures (missing 
an item, or accomplished from memory), and altitude deviations of less than 200 
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ft. Type I1 errors included the failure to notify the company or ATC of an 
abnormal situation, altitude deviations between 200 and 400 ft., failure to use 
ice-protection, over or under speed for current configuration, delayed recognition 
or handling of the hydraulic failure, and failure to run a required checklist. Type 
I11 errors included failure even to recognize that the hydraulic failure had t8aken 
place, deployment of speed brakes and thrust reversers prior to touchdown, 
failure to consider alternates other than the company recommended ROA, failure 
to notice the crosswind or takeoff and landing restrictions, improper handling of 
the abnormal procedures, and altitude deviations of more than 400 ft. 
Each videotape observer rated each error for severity and both observers 
discussed the rating for each recorded error. In cases where there was 
disagreement between observers about the correct classification, each observer 
presented his case in an attempt to reconcile the discrepancy. In most cases, 
agreement was reached. However, in a few cases when the observers could not 
agree, the error was assigned the lesser severity rating (there were no cases in 
which there was substantial disagreement between observers on a single error 
such as a Type I versus a Type I11 rating). All data that was used for analytical 
purposes represented the observers’ agreed upon ratings. 
2.11. Flight ere w Communication Putt erns 
Since past research has shown the interaction process of flightcrew members 
to be a significant predictor of flightcrew performance (e.g., Foushee & Manos, 
1981), extensive analyses of communications data were undertaken in this 
investigation. The procedure used to analyze within-cockpit communication 
patterns was adapted from the Foushee and Manos (1981) procedure that was in 
turn derived from the work of Bales (1950). Using this approach, each statement 
or phrase was coded into one of eighteen categories of communication: command, 
observation, suggestion, statement of intent, inquiry, agreement, disagreement, 
acknowledgement, answer supplying information, response uncertainty, tension 
release, frustration/anger/derisive remark, embarrassment, repeats, checklist, 
non-task related, non-codable, or ATC communications. Coders worked 
independently. If there was any doubt about how a given speech act should have 
been classified, the coders were instructed to place them in the non-codable 
category. Thus, all speech acts were included in the total communications 
analyses, even those classified as non-codable. A complete list of communication 
categories and operational definitions is contained in Appendix E. 
Two coders were trained extensively in the coding procedures by the 
principal investigator. The pretest videotapes were used for training purposes so 
that prior to actual coding, neither coder had seen the experimental videotapes. 
The training consisted of the selection of particularly demanding 10-min segments 
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of the pre-test tapes on which coders practiced transcribing and coding. A point- 
by-point agreement method was used t,o calculate interrater reliability (e.g., 
Kazdin, 1982). This met hod is substantially more conservative than commonly 
used met hods which compute interrater agreement based upon total frequencies. 
The point-by-point method is more conservative because it takes into account 
both the number of agreements and disagreements (or instances where one 
observer recorded one category and the other either recorded a different category 
or nothing at all). Total-frequency-based methods do not account for 
disagreements or non-events in this manner. Using this method, 71% agreement 
was established between the two coders. 
After the coders’ training had established a satisfactory level of reliability, 
each was randomly assigned half of the tapes to code. Each coder was assigned 
an equal number of tapes in the Pre- and Post-Duty conditions to rule out 
potential bias. Moreover, coders were blind to the condition when they were 
performing the communications analyses. 
Although it would have been desirable to have each coder review all of the 
tapes, this was impractical due to the extraordinary amount of time necessary to 
code each tape (up to 40 hrs. per experimental run). As a compromise procedure 
to ensure adequate interrater reliability, coder agreement was checked halfway 
through the coding process and at the end using selected segments of the pre-test 
videotapes. On both reliability checks, an adequate level of reliability was 




3.1. Demographic Data 
Captains in the Pre-Duty condition averaged 41.3 yr of age and had been 
employed by their airline for 14.8 yr Captains in the Post-Duty condition 
averaged 42 yr of age and had been employed for 15 yr. Neither of these 
differences was statistically significant. Total average flight time for the two 
groups was also comparable. There were no significant differences on measures 
related to height, weight, general health, or personality characteristics. 
First officers in the Pre-Duty condition averaged 39.1 yr of age and had been 
employed by the subject airline for 2.3 yr. Post-Duty first officers had a mean 
age of 39.7 yr. and had been employed for 3 yr. Average airline experience was 
greater for both groups of first officers since many had been previously employed 
by other air carriers. None of these differences were statistically significant. No 
other differences were significant for height, weight, or general health dimensions. 
9.2. Fatigue Data 
As expected, captains in the Pre-Duty condition had significantly more sleep 
the night before the experimental runs than did those in the Post-Duty 
condition--8.46 hr versus 5.71 hr (t = 4.00, p =.001). Post-Duty captains also 
reported marginally less sleep two days prior to the simulated flight. Mean sleep 
times for the previous night were 7.57 hr for Post-Duty captains and 8.82 hr for 
Pre-Duty captains (t = 1.64, p < .12). Differences three and four nights before 
were not statistically significant, which is indicative of the fact that Pre-Duty 
crews were often on duty during these time periods. Despite differences in the 
amount of sleep, there were no significant differences in reported sleep quality 
between the two conditions by captain subjects. 
The differences between conditions on the amount of sleep prior to the 
experiment for first officers were not as robust, but in the same direction. First 
officers in the Pre-Duty condition averaged 7.55 hr of sleep the night before, 
while Post-Duty subjects averaged 6.29 hr (t = 1.96, p < .07). None of the 
differences for previous nights were statistically significant. As for captains, no 
sleep-quality differences between conditions were reported for first officers. 
On measures of subjective fatigue, no significant differences were evident for 
captains or first officers on the l@cm.-line measure of alertness. However, on the 
7-point bipolar scale for fresh versus tired, captains in the Post-Duty condition 
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indicated that they were significantly more tired than captains in the Pre-Duty 
condition (t = -2.40, p < .03). The same pattern was evident, for first officers-- 
Post-Duty subjects reporting more overall "tiredness" (t = -4.76, p < .001). 
Analyses of the mood data generally confirmed that Post-Duty subjects were 
experiencing more fatigue at the time of the simulation. As in the field study, 
where mood changes were strongly correlated with with levels of fatigue, Post- 
Duty subjects tended to report more negative mood (t = -1.94, p =.06). 
However, differences on the positive and activation mood indices were not 
st at ist ically significant. 
Taken together, these data would seem to indicate that Post-Duty 
crewmembers were experiencing significantly more fatigue than Pre-Duty 
crewmembers. They reported less sleep, more l'tiredness'l, and more negative 
mood states than did Pre-Duty crewmembers. Though no attempt was made to 
control for the off-duty activities of PreDuty crewmembers (they may have been 
engaged in fatigue-inducing activity during this off-duty time), it may safely be 
assumed that these fatigue differences between conditions are associated with the 
duty cycle. 
9.9. Crew Performance Measures 
S.9.d. Observer Ratings. In the preflight segment of the simulation scenario, 
Post-Duty captains were rated better in crew coordination and marginally better 
in overall performance (t = -2.81, p < .02; and t = -1.81, p < .09, respectively), 
as can be seen in Tables 1 and 2. For first officers in this segment, differences 
were in the same direction, but not statistically significant. The lack of 
significant results for first officers on these measures probably reflects the fact 
that captains are primarily responsible for coordinating preflight activities. 
Table 1.  Observer Ratings of Captaina on Crew Coordination During the 
Preflight Segment of Simulation 
Crew Coordination for Captains 
Pre Post 
Mean 3.00 3.44 
SD (0.00) (0.53) 
N 11 9 
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Table 2. Observer Ratings of Captains on Overall Performance During the 
Preflight Segment of Simulation 
Overall Performance for Captains 
Pre Post, 
(0.44) 3-22 I 2.89 (0.33) 
No significant differences were evident for either captains or first officers in 
the taxi/takeoff segment. The same pattern was evident during the relatively 
uneventful climb segment; a slight trend for better rated performance among 
Post-Duty crewmembers, although these differences were not statistically 
significant. The only significant measure was for first officer ATC procedures 
(Table 3), with Post-Duty first officers rated higher on this measure (t = -2.10, p 
< .05). 
Table 9. Observer Ratings of First Officers on A T C  Communication During 
the Climb Segment of the Simulation 
ATC Communication for First Officers I 
Pre Post 
Mean 2.90 3.89 
SD (1.10) (0.93) 
Both coordination and procedures (Tables 4 and 5) were rated better for 
captains in the Post-Duty condition during the cruise segment (t = -1.99, p 
< .07; and t = -2.22, p < .04, respectively). These differences appear to reflect 
better handling of the the vigilance measures programmed into this flight phase 
(icing conditions and moderate turbulence). Mean differences on overall 
performance for captains in this segment suggested a slight edge for Post-Duty 
captains, but this difference was not statistically significant. 
Table 4 .  Observer Ratings of Captains on Crew Coordination During the 
Cruise Segment 
Crew Coordination for Captains 
Mean 3.27 3.78 
SD (0.47) (0.67) I 
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Table 5. Observer Ratings of Captains on Procedures During the Cruise 
Segment 
I Procedures for Captains I tEg-++q (0.00) (0.50) 
Post-Duty first officers were also rated better on the coordination measure 
(Table 6) during the cruise segment (t = -2.58, p < .02). They were also rated as 
having performed better on the planning dimension (Table 7) in this segment (t= 
-2.02, p < .06). 
Table 6.  Observer Ratings of First Officers on Crew Coordination During the 
Cruise Segment 
Crew Coordination for First Officers 
Mean 
(0.47) (0.60) 
Table 7. Observer Ratings of First Officers on Planning During the Cruise 
Segment 
Planning for First Officers 
(0.70) (0.73) 
For the approach segment into RIC, Post-Duty captains were rated better 
on the approach-planning measure (t = -2.01, p < .06), as can be seen in Table 8. 
The coordination rating (Table 9) was marginally significant, with Post-Duty 
captains again exhibiting better performance (t = -1.85, p =.08). First officers in 
the Post-Duty condition were also rated better on the planning measure (t = 
-2.07, p < .06), as portrayed in Table 10. 
Table 8. Observer Ratings of Captains on Approach Planning Measure During 
the Approach to RIC Segment 
Approach Planning for Captains I 
(0.94) (1.69) 
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Table 9. Observer Ratings of Captains on Coordination Measure During the 
Approach to RIC Segment 
1 Coordination for Captains I 
Mean 3.00 3.56 




Table 10. Observer Ratings of First Officers on Planning Measures During 
the Approach to RIC Segment 
I Planning Measures for First Oficers 1 
Pre Post 
Mean 1.82 2.78 
(0.87) (1.20) I 
For the missed-approach and emergency-procedure segment involving the 
System A hydraulic failure, Post-Duty captains were again rated better on 
planning and procedure measures (t = -2.19, p < .05; and t = -2.10, p < .05, 
respectively, Tables 11 and 12). The planning rating (Table 13) was also higher 
for first oficers in the Post-Duty condition (t = -2.32, p < .03). Differences 
between groups in this flight phase on the planning and procedures measures are 
particularly significant because they were designed to tap performance during a 
critically high-workload period of the simulation scenario (dealing with the 
implications of the hydraulic failure). 
Table 11. Observer Ratings of Captains on Planning Measures During the 
Missed- Approach and Emergency Procedure Segment 
I Plannine Measures for CaDtains I 
I Pre Post I 
Mean 2.91 3.89 
SD (1.14) (0.78) 
Table 12. Observer Ratings of Captains on Procedure Measures During the 
Missedc Approach and Emergency Procedure Segment 
Procedure Measures for Captains 
Pre Post 
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Table 19. Observer Ratings of First Officers on Planning Measures During 
the Missed- Approach and Emergent y- Procedure Segmenl 
Planning Measures for First Officers 




None of the other ratings for cruise-to-alternate and landing were 
statistically significant, although in several cases the means were in the same 
I direction (higher ratings for crewmembers in the Post-Duty condition). 
Taken as a whole, it is particularly significant that all of the reliable 
differences on this rating measure were in the same direction. This pattern 
strongly suggests that Post-Duty condition subjects performed better in several 
phases of flight. While there were many ratings, upon which no statistically 
significant differences manifested themselves, there was not a single case in which 
the pattern was reversed--better rated performance by Pre-Duty crewmembers. 
3.3.2. Ooerall Ratings. None of the overall ratings assessed at the end of the 
simulation approached stat is t ic a1 significance . 
3.3.3. Workload Ratings. On subject pilots’ own subjective ratings of 
workload levels experienced in the simulated flights, captains in the PreDuty 
condition felt that they had exerted significantly more mental effort than did 
captains in the Post-Duty condition (t = 2.16, p < .05). The workload-rating 
measure also asked subjects to report how tired they were, and as previously 
discussed (section 3.2), the Post-Duty captains reported that they were 
significantly more tired. For first officers, only the fatigue measure was 
significant . 
3.3.4. Aircraft Handling Data. Since the focus of the investigation was upon 
operational significance, analyses of aircraft handling data were confined to a 
particular flight segment in which these parameters were expected to be critically 
important. This segment involved the last few minutes of final approach to ROA 
where aircraft stability was of the utmost importance since speed, sink rate, and 
overall stability were expected to be strong predictors of the task of landing the 
aircraft at a higher-than-normal speed, with reduced braking effectiveness, on a 
short, wet runway. This was also the culmination of the scenario, where a 
number of high workload procedures (e.g. manual gear and flap operation) might 
have conspired to compromise normal aircraft handling performance. The 
manual control skills involved in aircraft handling were not considered as 
26 
important at other flight phases (e.g., climb and cruise), because these segments 
were characterized by low workload (e.g., autopilot usage). 
Four measures were used as indicants of stability during this segment; 
airspeed, vertical speed, localizer. and glideslope deviation. Absolute values were 
obtained for each measure during the last two min and thirty sec prior to 
touchdown at ROA--yielding 10 samples of each of the four parameters for all 
experimental runs. Because of computer problems, complete data were available 
for only 15 of the 20 experimental runs (9 in the Pre-Duty condition and 6 in the 
Post-Duty condition). In order to derive an overall index of aircraft stability and 
because these parameters are intercorrelated, the average for each of the four 
parameters was computed for each run, and these values were converted to z- 
scores. The z-scores for each of the parameters were summed yielding an overall 
index of aircraft stability during the final-approach segment. 
Comparison of the stability index between experimental conditions revealed 
that Pre-Duty crews were significantly more unstable during this final-approach 
segment than were Post-Duty crews (t = 2.35, p < .05). Tables 14 and 15 
portray the raw values for airspeed and vertical speed, and while these values 
were not used in the statistical analyses they help in understanding the nature of 
the effect. 
Table 14. Raw Scores for Airspeed (kt8) for Pre-Duty and Post-Duty Crews 
I Airspeed for Pre-Duty and Post-Duty Crews I 
Pre Post 
Mean 152.09 146.95 
SD (8.53) (3.74) 
Given the aircraft weight and 15 degree flap setting, the correct speed in the 
landing configuration was approximately 135 kts. Since there was a lo-kt. 
headwind, and since it is a widespread practice to add the extra speed, 145 kts. 
was the approximate target speed for final approach and landing. Table 14 
shows that Post-Duty crews averaged very close to this value (146.94 kts.), 
whereas Pre-Duty crews were somewhat faster (152.09 kts.). 
Table 15. 
Crews 
Raw scores for Vertical Speed (ft/min) for Pre-Duty and Post-Duty 
Vertical Speed for Pre-Duty and Post-Duty Crews 
Pre Post 
I 
Mean 858.90 803.17 I 
(157.78) (106.73) 
Precise tracking of the Instrument Landing System (ILS) approach at ROA 
27 
converts to a vertical descent rate of approximately 800 ft./min. Again, Post- 
Duty crews were very close to this value (803.17 ft./min.), while Pre-Duty crews 
averaged a higher vertical sink rate (858.89 ft./min.). 
Pre-Duty crews also averaged higher amounts of localizer and glideslope 
deviation than Post-Duty crews. This corresponds to more horizontal and 
vertical deviation from the desired approach path to the runway. 
9.9.5. Error Analyses. Table 16 summarizes the mean error frequencies for 
each condition and error type (Types I, 11, 111, and total errors). None of the 
differences between error categories or total errors were statistically significant 
between Pre- and Post-Duty crews. However, mean differences were in the same 
direction as previous results, particularly on Type I11 (operationally significant) 
and total errors. Mean Type I11 errors for PreDuty crews were 4.3 versus 2.33 
errors for Post-Duty crews. Pre-Duty crews averaged 9.2 total errors versus 7.0 
for Post-Duty crews. 
Table 16. Error Frequencies for Pre-Duty and Post-Duty Crews on Type I, 
Type 11, Type 111, and Total Errors. 
Type I Errors 
(1.03) (1.24) 
Type I1 Errors 
Pre Post 
Mean 3.70 3.11 
SD (3.56) (1.54) 
Type I11 Errors 
tG+i+-t (4.00) (2.83) 
- 
Total Errors I ( (7.27) (3.87) 
In an effort to better understand this somewhat counterintuitive pattern of 
findings (tired crews apparently performing better than rested crews) internal 
analyses were performed. These analyses addressed the fact that Post-Duty 
crews had typically flown the entire trip together, whereas Pre-Duty crews were 
typically composed of individuals who may not have flown together recently. 
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This phenomenon is probably representative of actual operational practice. At 
the end of a trip, a pilot is more aware of the capabilities and tendencies of other 
crewmembers than at the beginning of a trip. It was felt that this "crew 
familiarity" factor may have had some impact on the results. 
The reanalyses addressed the familiarity factor. One of the Post-Duty crews 
did not fly their last trip together prior to simulator evaluation, while two of the 
Pre-Duty crews had flown together the last time on duty. Thus, all of the data 
were reanalyzed based on who had flown together the last time on duty. The 
Pre- versus Post-Duty crew assignment was discarded for the purpose of this 
analysis. It is important to note that no attempt was made to partition subjects 
according to whether they knew each other or had ever flown together in the 
past. In fact, several crews in the '!Not Flown Together" condition had flown 
together at some point in the past. However, the analysis only addressed 
whether the crewmembers had flown together on the last duty cycle. 
The results of one of these reanalyses are presented in Table 17. As can be 
seen, there were several significant differences apparently attributable to this 
crew-familiarity factor. The difference between Type I (minor) errors was not 
significant, however for Type I1 (moderate) errors, crews that had not flown 
together averaged significantly more errors (4.78) than did crews that had flown 
together (2.20) on the last duty cycle (t = 2.20, p < .04). The same pattern was 
evident for Type I11 (major) and total errors. Crews that had not flown together 
averaged 5.67 Type I11 errors versus only 1.30 for crews that had flown together, 
and this difference is highly significant (t = 3.36, p c .004). There was also a 
strongly significant difference between these groups on total errors (t = 2.96, p 
< .009). Crews that had not flown together averaged 11.67 total errors whereas 
crews that had flown together averaged less than half (5.0) of this error total. 
Table 17. Error Frequencies for Crews that had Flown Together and Not 
Flown Together on Type I, Type 11, Type III, and Total Errors. 
I Type I Errors 1 
Flown Not Flown 
Mean 1.50 1.22 
SD (1.27) (0.97) 
Type I1 Errors 
Flown Not Flown 
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Type I11 Errors 
Flown Not  Flown 
Total Errors 





Mean 5.00 11.67 
SD (2.58) (6.60) 
In summary, significantly better performance by Post-Duty crewmembers 
was suggested by all of the various types of crew-performance measures. Many 
individual parameters were non-significant , but there were no reversals of this 
general pattern. It appears that much of this performance difference is due to 
the fact that Post-Duty crews, since they were tested at the end of their duty 
cycle, were more likely to have operated together. 
9.4. Crew Communication Analyses 
Extensive analyses of the crew communications process were undertaken 
since these variables represent perhaps the best reflection of how the crew 
coordinates its activities. Therefore, it was expected that these communications 
measures would facilitate the understanding of the performance effects, as has 
been suggested in the past (e.g., Foushee, 1984). 
Two types of analyses were performed. First, a 2 x 2 (Pre- vs. Post-Duty x 
I captain vs. first officer) between-subjects analysis-of-variance (ANOVA) was 
performed for each category as well as for total communication. The second type 
of analysis was designed to  look at communication variables as they were affected 
at  different phases of flight. It involved a 2 x 2 x 3 (Pre- vs. Post-Duty x captain 
vs. first officer x phase of flight) mixed-design ANOVA, also performed for each 
category. The three-factor phase-of-flight parameter was a within-subjects 
variable, and was broken down in the following manner: 1) the 10-min period 
immediately after rotation that was completely routine; 2) the 10-min period 
beginning after the decision to execute a missed approach; and 3) the 10-min 
period immediately prior to touchdown at ROA. Thus, one relatively low- 
workload period and two relatively high-workload periods were included in these 
analyses. 
I 
Since the familiarity variable appeared to be strongly related to crew 
performance in this study, the same analyses were conducted incorporating this 
factor. Both the 2 x 2 between subjects ANOVAs and the 2 x 2 x 3 mixed-design 
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-4NOVAs were identical except that the Flown Together-Not Flown Together 
variable was substituted for the Pre-Post Duty variable. 
I 
Means and SDs of Commands 
Pre- Capt Pre- F/O Post- Capt Post- F/O 
Mean (ROT) 10.00 0.00 15.56 0.22 
Mean (MA) 13.33 0.44 19.44 0.11 
Mean (TD) 12.89 0.56 17.44 1.22 
SD (2.78) (0.00) (6.56) (0.44) 
SD (4.74) (0.73) (10.31) (0.33) 
SD (3.82) (0.88) (7.70) (1.56) 
3.4.1. Commands. The 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA for commands revealed a 
significant main effect for the Pre-Post variable (F(1.32) = 4.07, p =.05) ,  
indicating that in general Post-Duty crewmembers exchanged more commands, 
and this was true of both captains and first officers in this condition. Not 
surprisingly, captains utilized this form of communication more often than did 
first officers (F(1,32) = 107.34, p < .001). It has been suggested elsewhere (e.g., 
Foushee & Manos, 1981) that commands appear to have a coordinating effect on 
crew performance because of their strong influence on subordinate crewmember 
actions. Commands were much more predominant during high workload phases of 
flight (F(2,64) = 37, p < .01). It is also interesting to note that first offkers who 
had recent operating experience with the captain they were flying with were more 
likely to use command-type statements. Increased familiarity may raise the 
probability that subordinate crewmembers will be more assertive when the 
circumstances call for such behavior. These results are summarized in Table 18. 
The same pattern was evident for commands on the 2 x 2 ANOVAs and on 
the 2 x 2 x3 ANOVAs on the familiarity factor. In short, performance appeared 
to be facilitated by the more prevalent usage of commands by captains in the 
Post-Duty condition, particularly during high workload phases of flight. 
8.4.2. Obeervations. The analyses for the variable, observations about flight 
status, revealed a significant main effect for crew position (F(1,32) = 14.84, p 
< .001). This effect was due to the fact that first officers utilize this category of 
communication more frequently than captains as can be seen in Table 19. This is 
logical in light of the support role assigned to first officers in flight duties, since 
observations about flight status are a primary means of providing information for 
the captain to act upon. The main effect for phase-of-flight was significant 
(F(2,64) = 13.23, p < ,001) indicating more observations during high-workload 
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periods. The interaction of crew position and flight segment was also significant 
(F(2,64) = 3.23, p < .05) and is due to the more prevalent use of this category of 
communications by first officers during high-workload phases. 
Means and SDs of Observations 
Pre- Capt Pre- F/O Post- Capt Post- F/O 
Mean (ROT) 12.89 20.33 19.11 22.33 
SD (7.18) (7.97) (13.46) (4.64) 
Mean (MA) 12.11 23.33 17.33 23.56 
SD (6.41) (8.76) (9.08) (10.88) 
Mean (TD) 19.78 29.67 18.11 33.44 
SD (5.65) (7.02) (5.90) (10.89) 
- 
3.4.3. Suggestions. For the category, suggestions, the main effect for crew 
position was again significant (F(1,32) = 26.97, p < .001), with captains 
responsible for more suggestions than first officers (Table 20). This is likely 
reflective of the captain's role in directing subordinate behavior, as suggestions 
are probably a "softer" means of providing directions than commands. The crew 
position by crew familiarity interaction approached statistical significance 
(F(1,32), p < .09). Captains who had flown with the same first officer tended to 
offer more suggestions than those who had not (Table 21). This may imply a 
somewhat less "directive" style among captains who are relatively familiar with 
other crewmembers on the flightdeck, since suggestions tend to be less directive. 
Means and SDs of Suggestions 
Pre- Capt Pre- F/O Post- Capt Post- F/O 
Mean (ROT) 2.78 0.89 3.56 0.89 
Mean (MA) 3.67 0.56 4.33 1.22 
SD (2.65) (0.73) (2.12) (1.99) 
SD (3.07) (0.93) (3.24) (0.78) 
Mean (TD) 4.67 1.56 3.89 1.56 
SD (2.35) (1.74) (2.26) (1.42) 
L 
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Table 21. Means and SDs of Suggestions for Captains and First o f f i cer s  in 
Flown Together (Ft) and Not Flown Together (Ay) Crews for Three Phases of 
Flight - 10-min After Rotation (ROT),  l a m i n  After Missed-Approach (MA), and 
10-min Prior  to  Touchdown (TD)  
I Means and SDs of Suggestions I 
Ft Capt ~~ Ft F/O Nf Capt Nf F/O 
Mean (ROT) 4.30 0.90 1.75 0.88 
SD (3.65) (0.88) (1.39) (0.83) 
Mean (MA) 4.80 0.90 3.00 0.88 
SD (2.04) (1.91) (2.45) (0.83) 
(1.75) 
4.50 1.40 4.00 
(2.37) (1.43) (2.27) 
3.4.4. Statements of Intent. This was another category which was assumed 
to reflect the amount of overall coordination. These communications are 
generally utilized to inform others of the actions that the speaker is about to 
undertake, and thus keep other crewmembers informed. Again, the main effect 
for crew position was significant (F(1,34) = 9.6, p < .004). First officers 
exhibited this form of communication more frequently than captains, but the 
crew-familiarity main effect was also marginally significant (F(1,34) = 3.58, p 
< .07). Statements of intent were relatively more prevalent among crewmembers 
who had flown together, as Table 22 portrays. This suggests one reason for 
coordination deficiencies that were apparent in the Pre-Duty or Not Flown 
Together conditions and may be in part responsible for the performance 
differences seen on previous measures. 
Table 22. Means and SDs of Statements of Intent for Captains and First 
Officers in Flown Together and Not Flown Together Crew8 
Means and SDs of Statements of Intent 
Flown Not Flown 
Capt Mean 8.90 3.67 
F/O Mean 14.20 11.44 
SD (6.40) (2.12) 
SD (7.24) (8.35) 
3.4.5. Inquiries. These are information-seeking behaviors des.gned to elicit 
assistance from other crewmembers. Mean differences can be seen in Tables 23 
and 24. Captains sought more information than fitst officers (F(1,34 = 3.87, p 
< .06), but this type of information-seeking behavior was far more prevalent 
during high workload phases of flight (F(1,32) = 9.81, p < .001). Neither the 
fatigue variable, nor the crew familiarity variable predicted any of the differences 
on this measure. 
33 
Table 29. Means and SDs of Inquiries for Captains and First Officers in Pre- 
D u t y  and Post-Duty Crews 
P re- D u t y 
SD (9.30) (20.18) 
F/O Mean 27.20 22.56 
SD (12.03) (11.37) 
P os t-D u ty - 
Capt Mean 30.80 36.44 
I Means and SDs of Inquiries I 
- 
- 
Table 24. Means and SDs of Inquiries for Captains and First Officers in 
Flown Together (Ft )  and Not Flown Together (Nf) Crews for Three Phases of 
Flight - 1 0 m i n  After Rotation (ROT),  1 0 m i n  After Missed-Approach (MA), and 
I 1 0 m i n  Prior to  Touchdown (TD)  
- 
Ft Capt Ft F/O Nf Capt Nf F/O 
Mean (ROT) 9.60 5.80 8.13 6.50 
SD (4.55) (3.94) (3.94) (2.45) 
Mean (MA) 13.10 7.40 11.25 11.13 
Mean (TD) 10.40 6.60 11 .oo 9.88 
SD (9.69) (4.93) (4.71) (5.38) 
SD (4.74) (2.72) (5.24) (3.72) 
9.4.6. Agreement. No differences on the agreement variable were statistically 
reliable, but it should be noted that agreement was an infrequently occurring 
category. 
9.4.7. Disagreemerat. On instances of verbal communication reflecting the 
statements of another, significant two-way interactions were obtained with the 
crew position variable on both the familiarity and the fatigue variables, and the 
mean differences for this category can be seen in Tables 25 and 26. In both cases, 
first officers were largely responsible for this effect. First officers in the Post- 
Duty condition were far more likely to disagree with the actions of captains 
(F(1,34) = 6.20, p < .02). The same was true for first officers who had flown with 
the same captain previously, only the effect was stronger (F(1,34) = 11.37, p 
< .002). It has been suggested that first officers, because of the role structure of 
the flightdeck, are often hesitant to question or correct the actions of captains 
and that this reluctance has been a factor in a substantial number of incidents 
and accidents (e.g. Cooper, White, & Lauber, 1979; Foushee & Manos, 1981; and 
Foushee, 1984). This result suggests that crewmember familiarity may mediate 
against this hesitancy and raises the probability that familiar first officers or 
subordinates will be more assertive when the circumstances call for such 
behavior. 
I disagreement of one crewmember with the actions, intended actions, or 
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Table 25. Means a.nd SDs of Disagreements for  Captains and First Officers in  
Pre-Duty and Post-Duty Crews 
Means and SDs of Disagreements 





Table 26. M e a m  and SDs of Disagreements for Captains and First Officers in 
Flown Together and Not Flown Together Crews 
Means and SDs of Disagreements 
Flown Not Flown 
SD (0.67) (1.69) 
F/O Mean 2.10 0.33 
SD (1.91) (0.50) 1 
3.4.8. Acknowledgements. Past research has demonstrated that 
acknowledgements to other communications are often associated with fewer 
crew-performance errors, and that these categories of communication tend to 
reinforce the interaction process (e.g. Foushee & Manos, 1981). The same was 
true in the present investigation. Acknowledgements were significantly more 
prevalent in crews that had flown together (F(1,34) = 8.33, p < .007), as Table 
27 suggests. Acknowledgements were also seen more frequently in high workload 
segments of flight (F(2,64) = 3.35, p < .05), suggesting that they play an even 
more important role in the communications process during critical phases of flight 
(Table 28). 
Table 27. Meatur and SDs of Acknowledgements for Captains and First 
Officers in Flown Together and Not Flown Together Crews 
Means and SDs of Acknowledgements 
Flown Not Flown 
Capt Mean 46.70 33.89 
(12.86) (17.45) 
F/O Mean 59.30 41.33 
(20.52) (13.44) 
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Table 28. Means and SDs of Acknowledgements for Captains and First 
Officers in Flown Together ( F t )  and Not Flown Together (Nf) Crews for Three 
Phases of Flight - 10-min After Rotation (ROT),  10-min After Missed- Approach 
(M.4), and 1Omin Prior to Touchdown (TD) 
S D  (4.28) (8.97) (4.20) (5.01) 
Mean (MA) 15.00 16.60 9.25 10.63 
Means and SDs of Acknowledgements 
Ft Capt Ft F/O Nf Capt Nf F/O 
- 
I Mean [ROT) 11.90 16.10 10.25 10.25 I 
SD (6.24) (7.28) (6.94) (4.14) 
Mean (TD) 15.50 17.60 11 .oo 13.50 
SD (6.65) (5.48) (6.23) (5.18) 
- 
8.4.0. Answer Supplying Information. Responses to requests for information 
were more prevalent among first officers (F(1,34) = 3.99, p < .06). This is not 
surprising since by definition, these behaviors are usually responses to commands, 
inquiries or observations that are more likely to come from the captain. First 
officers in the Post-Duty condition were more likely to  exhibit this type of 
behavior (F(1,34) = 3.84, p < .06), as were first officers who had recent operating 
experience with their captains (F(1,34) = 3.38, p < .07). These results are 
summarized in Tables 29 and 30, and again imply that more overall information 
exchange occurred in crews with recent operating experience together. 
I 
Table 20. Means and SDs of Answers Supplying Information for Captains and 
First Officers in Pre-Duty and Post-Duty Crews 
~ ~~ 
Means and SDs of Answers Supplying Information 
PreDuty Post-Duty 
Capt Mean 17.80 11.44 
(6.43) (4.16) 
F/O Mean 17.90 21.67 
(7.75) (11.72) 
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Table 50. Means and SDs of Answers Supplying Information for Captains and 
First Officers in Flown Together and Not Flown Together Crews 
Means and SDs of Tension Releases 
Flown Not Flown 
I Means and SDs of Answers Sumlvine; Information I 
- 
Flown Not Flown I 
Capt Mean 12.40 17.33 
F/O Mean 2 1.90 17.22 
(4.30) (7.35) 
::[ (10.34) (8.94) 
3.4.10. Response Uncertainty. No differences were evident as a function of 
any of the independent variables on this measure. There was a marginal tendency 
for more of this type of behavior in high workload flight phases, although it was 
not statistically significant (F(1,32) = 2.43, p < .lo). Response uncertainty was 
infrequently verbalized by crewmembers, but communication coders anecdotally 
reported non-verbal indications. Such data were not systematically obtained 
because of their inherent unreliability. 
9.4.11. Tension Release. This category was operationalized as a reflection of 
non-task-related behavior and typically consisted of laughter or humorous 
remarks. A significant main effect for the crew-familiarity variable was evident 
on this measure (F(1,34) = 4.14, p < .05), as can be seen in Table 31. There was 
significantly more tension release among crewmembers who had not flown 
together prior to the simulator sessions. This difference may be a reflection of 
the acquaintance process for crewmembers unfamiliar with each other. However, 
as can be seen in Table 32, this difference was primarily evident for the low 
workload segment and diminished significantly during the high workload flight 
segments (F(2,64) = 8.0, p < .002). 
Table 91. Means and SDs of Tension Releases for Captains and First Officers 




Table 92. Means and SDs of Tension Releases for Captains and First Off‘ rcers 
in Flourn Together (Ft) and Not Flown Together (Nf) Crews for Three Phases of 
Flight - 10-min .4fter Rotation (ROT), 10-min After Missed- Approach (MA), and 
10-min Prior to Touchdown ( T D )  
Means and SDs of Tension Releases 
Ft Capt Ft F/O Nf Capt N f F / O  
I Mean (ROT) 1.90 2.60 4.88 5.00 I 
Si, (2.64) (4.12) (6.64) (4.38) 
Mean (MA) 0.80 1.10 2.63 1.50 
SD (1.40) (1.20) (4.17) ( 3.46) 
SD (1.14) (1.16) (2.05) (1.85) 
Mean (TD) 0.80 1.30 1.75 2.00 
3.4.12. Frustration/A nger. Captains exhibited considerably more of this 
type of behavior than did first officers (Table 33) regardless of experimental 
condition (F(1,34) = 11.58, p < .002). Phase of flight was also a significant 
predictor as might have been expected (F(2,64) = 3.76, p < .03). Table 34 
suggests that this difference is attributable to the fact that more frustration 
occurred during the high workload phases of flight. The fact that captains are 
more prone to this type of behavior is no doubt strongly tied to the captain’s 
authority role. 
Table 99. Meam and SDs of Frustration for Captains and First Officers in 
Flown Together and Not Flown Together Crews 
Means and SDs of Frustration 
Flown Not Flown 
(3.87) (7.20) 
(1 -64) 
F/O Mean 0.10 
(0.31) 
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Table 34. Means and SDs of Frustration/Anger for Captains and First 
Officers in Flown Together (Ft) and Not Flown Together (Nf) Crews for Three 
Phases of Flight - 10-min After Rotation (ROT), l a m i n  After Missed Approach 
( M A ) ,  and  10-min Prior to Touchdown (TD) 
Mean (MA) 0.20 0.30 0.13 0.13 
SD (0.42) (0.48) (0.35) (0.35) 
Mean (TD) 0.00 0.20 0.63 0.50 
SD (0.00) (0.42) (0.74) (0.53) 
Means and SDs of Frustration/Anger 
Ft Capt Ft F/O Nf Capt NfF/O 
Mean (ROT) 0.90 0.00 1.13 0.00 
SD (1.85) (0.00) (1.13) (0.00) 
Mean (MA) 1.70 0.00 2.25 0.13 
Mean (TD) 1.60 0.10 2.63 1.13 
SD (1.89) (0.00) (4.10) (0.35) 
SD (1.51) (0.32) (4.14) (1.73) 
- 
~ 4 . 1 %  Embarrassment. This type of behavior typically consisted of 
apologetic remarks as a result of mistakes or oversights on the part of one 
crewmember. None of the main effects for any of the experimental variables were 
significant, but a marginally significant two-way interaction between the crew 
familiarity variable and phase of flight was found (F(2,64) = 3.12, p < .06). This 
type of behavior was more often seen among crewmembers who had not 
previously flown together during the high workload phases of flight, as can be 
seen in Table 35. This finding appears consistent with the performance profiles of 
crewmembers in this condition. Crewmembers who had not flown together made 
significantly more serious errors. 
Table 55. Meam and SDs of Embarrassment for Captains and First Off'  rcers 
in Flown Together (Ft) and Not Flown Together (Nj) Crews for Three Phases of 
Flight - 10-min After Rotation (ROT), 1Omin After Mime& Approach (MA), and 
l a m i n  Prior to Touchdown (TD) 
Means and SDs of Embarrassment 
Ft Capt Ft F/O Nf Capt Nf F/O 
Mean (ROT) 0.50 0.10 0.13 0.38 
SD (1.27) (0.32) (0.35) (0.52) 
39 
3.4.14. Non- Task-Related Communication. This category included crew 
interaction that was clearly not related to flight tasks. On this measure, the 
main effect for crew familiarity was significant (F(1,32) = 7.29, p < .02). Crews 
that had not flown together engaged in more non-tasked-related interaction than 
crews that had flown together, which may be related to the fact that they were 
probably becoming acquainted. This was more apparent during low workload 
periods of flight since the main effect for flight phase was also strongly significant 
(F(2,64) = 7.18, p < .002). The two-way interaction between phase of flight and 
crew familiarity was also significant (F(2,64) = 4.26, p < .02), indicating that 
non-task-related interaction was far more prevalent among crewmembers that 
had not flown together during low workload periods. The means for these 
analyses are shown in Table 36. 
Mean (MA) 0.20 0.00 0.13 0.13 
SD (0.63) (0.00) (0.35) (0.35) 
Mean (TD) 0.00 0.00 0.25 0.25 
SD (0.00) (0.00) (0.46) (0.71) 
Table 96. Means and SDs of Now Task- Related Communication for Captains 
and First Officers in Flown together (Ft) and Not Flown Together (Nf) Crews for 
Three Phases of Flight - 1 0 m i n  After Rotation (ROT), 1 0 m i n  After Missed- 
Approach (MA), and 10-min Prior to Touchdown (TD)  
- 
r Means and SDs of Non-Task-Related Communication I 
Ft Capt Ft F/O Nf Capt Nf F/O 
Mean (ROT) 0.40 0.20 2.00 2.13 
SD (0.70) (0.42) (3.21) (3.48) 
9.4.15. Repetitions. This category waa intended to reflect instructions from 
one crewmember to another that were repeated in quick succession. 
Communications of this type are typically used to convey a sense of urgency or to 
assure that an instruction has been received by the crewmember to whom it was 
addressed. None of the main effects were significant, but the interaction between 
the crew position and the fatigue variables was statistically significant (F( 1,34) = 
4.59, p < .04), as can be seen in Table 37. Post-Duty captains repeated 
instructions more often than either captains in the Pre-Duty condition or first 
officers in either condition. This finding may explain, in part, the apparently 
better coordination among Post-Duty crewmembers who were previously 
acquainted, since repetitions may have assured that critical pieces of information 
were transferred between crewmembers at appropriate times. The 2 x 2 x 3 
ANOVAs were not performed on this measure because of insufficient instances of 
this behavior across all of the flight phases. 
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Table 97. Means and SDs of Repetitions for Captains and Fitst Officers in 
Pre-Duty and Post-Duty Crews 
Means and SDs of Repetitions r 
P re- D 11 t y 
SD (0.67) (1.51) 
F/O Mean 1.80 1.56 
SD (1.23) (1.33) 
Post - D ut  y 
Capt Mean 1 .oo 2.14 
9.4.16. Checklist Items. These communications were merely the challenges 
issued on standard procedural checklists required at various flight phases. No 
effects for the fatigue or crew familiarity variables were evident, however the 
main effect for crew position was significant (F(1,34) = 30.35, p < .001). First 
officers were responsible for most of these communications (Table 38), which is 
entirely logical since they were assigned non-flying pilot duties for the simulation. 
Table 98. Means and SDs of Checklist Items for Captains and First Officers 
in Pre-Duty and Post-Duty Crews 
Means and SDs of Checklist Items 
P re-Du ty Post -Duty 
(1.96) (2.65) 
Capt Mean 
F/O Mean 12.70 13.44 
SD (2.79) (4.56) 
5.4.17. Air Traffic Control Communications. Once again, the main effect for 
crew position was significant (F(1,34) = 256.93, p < .001), with first officers 
almost entirely responsible for ATC communication (Table 39). As with 
checklist duties, ATC communications are almost entirely the responsibility of 
the non-flying pilot. 
Table 99. Means and SDs of A T C  Communications for Captains and First 
Officers in Pre-Duty and Post-Duty Crews 
Means and SDs of ATC Communications 
Capt Mean 7.50 8.89 
Pre-Duty Post-Duty 
SD (8.48) (10.91) 
F/O Mean 75.60 80.22 
SD (10.63) (20.85) 
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9.4.18. Total Communication. It was expected that total communication, or 
the sum of a11 types of communication including non-codable verbal behavior 
throughout the simulated flight, would be related to overall performance (e.g. 
Foushee & Manos, 1981). This was suggested in the present investigation as the 
main effect for the crew familiarity variable was marginally significant (F( 1,34) = 
3.55, p < .07). Overall, communication was more frequent in crews that had 
flown together than in crews that had not, as Table 40 reveals. This is 
particularly interesting in light of the significant performance differences between 
these groups. First officers exhibited more overall communication than captains 
(F(1,34) = 4.72, p < .04), and this is most likely due to the fact that first officers, 
in their non-flying role, were more involved in supplying task-relevant 
information for captains’ use in decision-making. 
Table 40. Means and SDs of Total Communication for Captains and First 
Officers in Flown Together and Not Flown Together Crews 
I Means and SDs of Total Communication 
Flown Not Flown 1 
Capt Mean 335.40 285.89 
(79.03) (53.22) 
F/O Mean 369.90 341.33 
(59.42) (58.60) 
The 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVAs were not performed because the three-level flight 
phase variable did not encompass the entire time period involved in the 
simulated flight. Thus, this analysis was not an accurate representation of total 
communications in the simulated flight. 
3.4.19. Communications Summary. In general, the communications 
variables, as measures of group interaction and coordination, reflected the same 
trends evident for the crew performance measures. Post-Duty crews and crews 
that had flown together engaged in more task-related communication and less 
non-task related communication. As expected, instances of various 
communications behaviors increased with increasing task demands. These 
analyses appeared to support the conclusion that the performance differences seen 
in this study were in large part caused by differences in crew coordination. This 
conclusion is based on the assumption that crew communication patterns are at 
least partial reflections of the coordination process, since they are the means by 
which many individual efforts are coordinated. Crews that had flown together 




The issue of excessive flightcrew fatigue, as a result) of trip exposure, has 
been a primary concern of the aviation community for a long time, but there has 
been little tangible evidence with which to confirm or deny the extent or 
operational significance of fatigue associated with duty-cycle exposure. We have 
discussed how laboratory studies have been of little use to those interested in 
aviation safety because of the difficulty of generalizing laboratory performance 
measures to the task of operating a complex aircraft. Thus, the operational 
significance issue was a pivotal part of this investigation. 
This study examined the performance of 20 volunteer twin-jet transport 
crews in a full-mission simulator scenario that included many aspects of an actual 
line operation. The scenario involved both routine flight operations and an 
unexpected hydraulic failure complicated by weather problems that resulted in a 
high level of crew workload. Approximately half of the crews flew the simulation 
within two to three hr after completing a three-day, high-density, short-haul duty 
cycle. The other half flew the scenario after an average of three days off duty. 
The high-density duty cycles that were the focus of this investigation averaged 
eight hr of on-duty time per day and five takeoffs and landings, with at least one 
day (usually the last) averaging close to thirteen hr of duty and eight takeoffs 
and landings. These figures do not include the time associated with flying the 
simulated flight, and if these numbers are included, the last duty day for Post- 
Duty crews approached sixteen hr and nine takeoffs and landings. 
The results of the study revealed that, as expected, Post-Duty crews were 
significantly more "fatigued" than Pre-Duty crews. The former averaged less 
sleep and reported higher levels of fatigue than the latter. However, results on the 
crew performance measures indicated that this level of fatigue did not affect the 
performance of flightcrews in any operationally significant manner. As has been 
shown, the performance of Post-Duty crews was actually better than the 
performance of PreDuty crews on a number of dimensions relevant to flight 
safety. Post-Duty crews were rated as performing better by an expert observer 
on many significant dimensions, and although there were many measures that did 
not discriminate between the two groups, there were no cases where the 
performance of Pre-Duty crews was rated as superior. Post-Duty crews flew 
more stable approaches, and they tended to make fewer significant operational 
errors than did Pre-Duty crews. 
To some, this very consistent pattern of results may seem paradoxical. 
However, it is important to note when considering how crews are usually assigned 
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to  flight duties. that there is a substantive difference between crews at the 
1)egiiining of t h e  duty cycle and crews at the end of a trip, regardless of the 
fatigue f a c t o r .  .Ifter three days of flying with another crewmember, one knows a 
~ o ~ l s i c l ~ r n  1)Ic a~iioiint about his or her operating characteristics, personality. and 
C O l 1 l I l i l l n l C i i t  1011 style. For example. copilots learn when and how an aircraft 
coniIiiaiider or captain likes to be assisted. Captains become familiar with the 
tendencies of their subordinates--how they supply information, and how best to 
elicit their input. Obviously, there is wide variation in human interaction, and 
the more individuals learn about their coworkers, the better they are able to 
tailor their behavior to the needs of a particular interaction. 
In an effort to control for this familiarity factor, some crews were assigned to 
conditions differentially. In some cases, Post-Duty or tired crewmembers from 
different trips were assigned as a simulation crew, so they had not necessarily 
flown together recently. Likewise, Pre-Duty or rested crews were assigned to the 
simulation from the ranks of individuals who had just finished a trip together, 
but had been off-duty for three days. All of the data were then reanalyzed based 
on who had flown together on the most recent duty cycle or not (independent of 
the fatigue factor), and a very striking pattern of results emerged--the 
performance differences became stronger. It is readily apparent that crews in 
which the two pilots had flown together on the preceding duty cycle made 
significantly fewer errors than crews who had not, particularly the more serious 
types of errors--the Type I1 and Type I11 errors. This same pattern was evident 
for all of the other measures in these reanalyses, and they too exhibited larger 
performance differences. Recent operating experience appears to be a strong 
influence on crew performance and may have served as a countermeasure to the 
levels of fatigue present in Post-Duty crewmembers. 
Examination of the flightcrew communication patterns in this study, as 
manifestations of the crew coordination process, suggests that this dimension is at 
least partially responsible for the performance differences. Crews that had flown 
together communicated significantly more overall, and these differences were in 
logical directions when compared with the significant performance variations. As 
in the Foushee and Manos (1981) study which found commands associated with 
better performance, captains in crews that had flown together issued more 
commands, but so did copilots (even though the frequency of copilot commands 
was relatively low). This finding may reflect a better understanding and division 
of responsibility between familiar crewmembers. There were more suggestions 
made in crews that had flown together, and more statements of intent by each 
crewmember, also indicating more willingness to exchange information. 
Another replication of the Foushee and Manos findings revealed 
acknowledgements associated with better performance. There were many more 
acknowledgements of communications by both captains andtfirst officers who had 
flown together. Foushee and Manos suggested that acknowledgements serve to 
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reinforce the communications process, and the same phenomenon appears to have 
played a role in this study. It is particularly interesting that more disagreement 
was exhibited by first officers who had flown with the same captain during the 
preceding three days. This suggests that increased familiarity may he a partial 
cure for the frequently problematic hesitancy of subordinates to question the 
actions of captains. 
There was significantly more non-task-related communication in crews that 
had not flown together, which may well indicate that they spent more time 
attempting to get to know each other. There was also significantly more tension 
release among crews who had not previously flown together. Also interesting was 
the presence of more frustration among captains who had not flown with the 
same copilot during the preceding duty cycle. 
4.2. Operational Significance 
It is the consistency of these results that is particularly striking. Duty-cycle 
exposure had no apparent effect on any of the parameters associated with flight 
safety. It is also interesting to note that the positive effects on crew coordination 
of some unknown amount of recent operating experience can be an effective 
countermeasure to the levels of fatigue associated with the duty cycles examined 
in this study. Whereas fatigue tends to be more prevalent during the later stages 
of a given duty cycle, crew coordination may be better as well because of the 
increased familiarity of crewmembers. 
One of the obvious limitations of this study is that we are unable to closely 
examine the interaction of fatigue and crew familiarity. For example, it would be 
enlightening to look at the performance of tired crews who are familiar with each 
other versus those who are not and to repeat these comparisons for rested crews. 
Such an analysis could yield important insights into the effectiveness of crew 
familiarity as a countermeasure. Unfortunately, the sample only included one 
'Tatigued" crews that had not flown together, while only two of the '9ested" crews 
had flown together, and the restricted amount of data precluded these analyses. 
Another limitation is related to the fact that we cannot determine from these 
data the amount or degree of familiarity necessary to  produce a desired level of 
crew coordination. We can say with a fair amount of confidence that the recency 
of crew familiarity seems to  be the key component, rather than the absolute 
amount. Most of the crews that had not flown together (as operationalized in 
these analyses) did know each other, and had flown together at some point in the 
past, but not within the last two or three months. Despite these rather 
compelling results, it would be a mistake to suggest a policy establishing the 
creation of relatively permanent crew assignments based on these data. There 
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may be negative aspects associated with flying with the same person over a long 
period of time, such as complacency. boredom, and so on. It could well be that 
continued pairing of the same individuals would ultimately lead to a reversal of 
this pattern--worse performance associated with increased familiarity. 
Unfortunately, no research presently exists to substantiate this possibility 
(although the operational community generally believes this, to be true), and it is 
not known how much familiarity might lead to this reversal. 
It is interesting to speculate about the differences between this study and 
other research efforts that have demonstrated performance deficits associated 
with fatigue. It has been suggested (see Holding, 1983, for a review) that fatigue 
causes more minor types of errors because of its deleterious effect on the 
attentional process. This line of reasoning suggests that fatigue lowers attentional 
capacity, and the cumulative effect of lower attentional capacity coupled with 
low motivation on 'less exciting" tasks tends to produce more error. It is arguable 
that since these non-engaging types of tasks tend to be of limited significance, 
any apparent performance deficits might be characterized minor, for the most 
part. However, this study provided no real support for this notion. There was a 
slightly larger number of Type I (minor) errors committed by Post-Duty crews, 
but the difference was not statistically reliable. Nevertheless, this remains a 
credible hypothesis considering the fact that traditional studies of fatigue effects 
have utilized performance measures that are not necessarily operationally 
significant. 
The performance environment in this investigation was different from that 
found in traditional studies, and the high levels of realism and workload 
associated with segments of the simulation scenario no doubt produced average 
arousal levels greater than those typically found in lower fidelity studies 
measuring psychomotor effects. The high levels of crew workload associated with 
the operational problems faced by crews in this study demanded close attention, 
produced high motivation, and probably reduced boredom to a minimum. Since 
the subjects in this investigation were highly skilled, professional pilots 
performing identical tasks to those they perform in the real world, it is safe to 
assume that the motivation to  perform well was quite high. This is in striking 
contrast to the boredom and lack of motivation often associated with classic, 
psychomotor measures such as reaction times. Thus it appears that arousal may 
be a key moderator of fatigue effects. Optimal levels of arousal appear to be 
harder to maintain when the operator is fatigued, but task demands may override 
this difficulty to some unknown extent. However, when task demands are low, 
the effects of fatigue may be manifested in performance deterioration more often. 
There is fairly convincing evidence that monitoring and vigilance during boring 
tasks is substantially degraded when the operator is fatigued (e.g., Holding, 
1983). 
If arousal does prove to be a key moderator of fatigue effects, it poses 
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something of a complex puzzle for researchers interested in the implications of the 
fatigue-performance relationship for flight safety. On one hand, during low 
workload segments of flight, we might expect the effects of fatigue to be 
apparent, since low task demands produce low arousal. Thus, we can expect 
reduced performance when fatigue reaches some significant level, but since task 
demands are low (and the effects of performance decrements likely to be minor) it 
is reasonable to suggest that the effects of fatigue often may not be operationally 
significant. On the other hand, when task demands are high and if arousal does 
effectively counteract the effect of duty cycle exposure, then performance may 
not be affected (as in the present study). Periods of high task demand are 
precisely the times when good performance is most important, and performance 
parameters during these periods are usually the primary concern of aviation 
safety specialists. Again, one is drawn to the conclusion that fatigue may be 
present, but that its effects are not necessarily operationally significant. The 
problem with this line of reasoning is that occasionally minor attentional or 
performance lapses during periods of low task demand can precipitate a sequence 
of events leading to a serious incident or accident, as we have seen in the past. 
There was no evidence that fatigue produced such a sequence in this study, but 
the crew coordination process did appear to play a key role in eliminating the 
progression of a minor errors into major problems. As we have sought to 
demonstrate, coordination appeared to be better in short-haul crews at the end of 
the duty-cycle when they were presumably experiencing the highest cumulative 
effect of fatigue. These results clearly suggest that the system contains a "built- 
in" countermeasure, of sorts. 
4.3. Implications for Long-Haul Operations 
Despite the fact that these results are probably representative of the typical 
short-haul operation, it is not known whether the same phenomenon will be 
prevalent in long-haul, transmeridian operations or at  higher levels of fatigue. 
While it is clear that the levels of fatigue associated with these short-haul duty 
cycles produced numerous psychological and physiological effects (see Gander et 
al., 1986), it is possible that these levels were not great enough to cause severe 
performance difficulties, as these results suggest. However, at some point, the 
level of fatigue or circadian dysrhythmia may well subsume the compensatory 
advantages of arousal or a well-coordinated crew operat ion. Long-haul flight 
operations, with longer duty days and other complications associated with time- 
zone shifts, may well produce more drastic effects. Another feature that 
distinguishes long- from short-haul operations is the predominance of extended 
stretches of low-workload cruise segments, in which arousal levels are no doubt 
lower, over longer periods of time, than in short-haul operations. 
Moreover, too much crew familiarity, as in some long-haul operations where 
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duty cycles can last. 10 days or more, may lead to levels of complacency at which 
adverse effects on performance begin to manifest themselves. Such a 
phenomenon is particularly characteristic of groups in which too much cohesion 
or trust has developed, because of a reduced tendency to monitor or criticize the 
performance of others (Janis, 1972). There are presently no data with which to 
answer these questions. Plans are underway for further high-fidelity simulation 
work that may shed light on these issues. 
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APPENDIX A 
SHORT-HAUL SIMULATOR STUDY OBSERVER RATING FORM ( v .5) 
Cond i ti on 
Capt. ID F/O ID Observer 
use the following ratings for all categories: 
1 - below average 
2 - slightly below average 
3 - average 
4 - slightly above average 
5 - above average 
n/a - not observed or not applicable 
CHT 
Capta i n F i rst Off i cer Notes 
Crew Coordination/Communications 
ATC/Company Communi cations 
Plan. & Sit. Awareness 
Procedures, Check1 ists, Cal louts 
PA & PAX Handling 
Overall Performance & Execution 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
I AXIITAKEOFF 
Capta i n First Officer Notes 
Crew Coordination/Communications 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
ATC/Company Communications 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
Plan. & Sit. Awareness (mach trim) 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Plan. & Sit. Awareness (T/O alt.) 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
Procedures, Checklists, Callouts 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
PA & PAX Handling 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Aircraft Handling 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
Overall Performance & Execution 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
CLIMB 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Crew Coord i nat i on/Commun i cat i ons 
ATC/Company Communications 
Plan. 0 Sit. Awareness (T-storm) 
Procedures, Checklists, Callouts 
PA & PAX Handling 
Aircraft Handling 
Overall Performance & Execution 
Capta i n F i rst Off i cer Notes 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n / a  1 2 3 4 5 n / a  
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
LKUlSt 
Capta i n First Officer Notes 
Crew Coordination/Comnunications 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
5 1  
ATC/Company Communications 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
Plan. & S i t .  Awareness 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
Procedures, Checklists, Cal louts  1 2 3 4 5 n/a 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
PA & PAX Handling 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
A i r c r a f t  Handling 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
Overall Performance & Execution 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Crew Coordination/Communications 
ATC Company Communications 
Plan. It S i t .  Awareness 
Procedures, Checklists, Cal louts  
PA & PAX Handling 
Stress Management (missed appr.) 
A i r c r a f t  Handling 
Overall Performance It Execution 
Capta i n F i r s t  Of f i cer  Notes 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n / a  1 2 3 4 5 n / a  
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
m G E N C Y  PROCED URE--SYSTEM A HYDRAULIC FAILURE 
Crew Coordination/Comunications 
ATC/Company Communications 
Plan. & S i t .  Awareness 
Procedures, Checklists, Cal louts  
PA & PAX Handling 
Stress Management 
A i r c r a f t  Handling 
Overall Performance & Execution 
CRUISE TO A L m T E  
Crew Coordination/Comunications 
ATC/Company Communications 
Plan. & S i t .  Awareness 
Procedures, Checklists, Cal louts  
PA It PAX Handling 
Stress Management 
A i r c r a f t  Handling 
I Overa I I Performance & Execution 
I 
I ROACH & LANDING 
Crew Coordination/Comunications 
ATCICompany Communi c a t  i ons 
Plan. & S i t .  Awareness 
Procedures, Checklists, Cal louts  
PA k PAX Hand I i ng 
Stress Management 
A i r c r a f t  Handling 
Overall Performance It Execution 
Capta i n F i r s t  Of f i cer  Notes 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n / a  1 2 3 4 5 n / a  
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
Capta i n F i r s t  Of f i cer  Notes 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
Capta i n F i r s t  Of f i cer  Notes 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n/a 1 2 3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2 3 4 5 n / a  1 2 3 4 5 n / a  
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
1 2  3 4 5 n/a 1 2  3 4 5 n/a 
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GENERA L COU#bJTS (b riefly summarize your impressions o f  this crew) 
ORS (list in detail a l l  errors committed by the crew during this session) 
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APPENDIX B 
CHECK PILOT OBSERVER OVERALL RATING FORM (Captain.form*) 
Cond i ti on 
Capt. I D  FO I D  Rater 
P i l o t  F l y ing  ----------------- ...................... 
Use the fo l low ing  ra t ings :  1 = below average 
2 = s l i g h t l y  below average 
3 = average 
4 = s l i g h t l y  above average 
5 = above average 
For each item, c i r c l e  the r a t i n g  t h a t  best  describes - the captain. --- 
1. Overall knowledge o f  a i r c r a f t  and procedures. 
2. Overa 
3 .  Overa 
1 2 3 4 5 
I technical  p ro f i c iency .  
1 2 3 4 5 
I smoothness ( f l y i n g  p i l o t  only) 
1 2 3 4 5 
4. Crew coordinat ion and in te rna l  communication ( in tent ions are c lear  
t o  a l  I crew members, proper ca l  louts  made, etc.) . 
1 2 3 4 5 
5 .  External communication (ATC ins t ruc t ions  ver i f ied,  proper ly monitored, 
e tc  .) 
1 2 3 4 5 
6. Overall mot ivat ion 
1 2 
7.  Command a b i l i t y  
1 2 
3 4 5 
3 4 5 
54 
8 .  Vigi lance 
1 2 3 4 
9 .  Overall performance 
1 2 3 4 
5 
5 
* F i r s t  Of f icer  form was ident ical  except t h a t  I tem #7 was omitted. 
APPENDIX C 
PILOT WORKLOAD RATING FORM 
P i  l o t  Name Date 
Posi t ion PF PNF (check one) ---------- ..................................................................... 
1. 
o f  work I oad . 
Please c i r c l e  the number which best corresponds t o  the overa l l  level 
-
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
I ow high 
2. Please r a t e  your - own performance on the simulated f l i g h t .  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
very poor very good 
3 .  How much a t ten t i on  d i d  t h i s  f l i g h t  demand? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
very l i t t l e  a great  deal 
4 .  How complex was the  f l i g h t ?  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
not a t  a l l  very 
5 .  How much - time pressure d i d  you fee l  dur ing the  f l i g h t ?  
none a great  deal 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
' 6. How much mental e f f o r t  d i d  the  f l i g h t  require? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
none a great  dea 
7. How busy were you? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
not a t  a l l  very 
56 
8.  How d i f f i c u l t  was the  f l i g h t ?  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
easy d i f f i c u l t  
9 .  How motivated were you t o  perform? 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
not a t  a1 I very 
10. How do you - f e e l  a f t e r  the simulated f l i g h t ?  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
fresh t i  red 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
r e  I axed tense 
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APPENDIX D 
PHYSICAL STATE DATA FORM 
I D #  Condition C a p t -  or FO (circle one) 
P lease  f i l l  i n  t he  approximate times you went t o  sleep and when you awoke 
for t he  previous  four n i g h t s  as best you can remember. 
EST or EDT (circle one)  
Time Asleep Time Awoke Total  Nap Time T o t a l  Sleep Time 
, 
L a s t  n i g h t  (hrs/min 1 ( h r s )  
2 n i g h t s  ago - (hrs/min) ( h S )  
3 n i g h t s  ago (hrs/min ) (hrs 1 
4 n i g h t s  ago (hrs/min 1 ' ( h r s )  
Rate your l a s t  n i g h t ' s  sleep from leas t  (1 )  t o  m a s t  ( 5 )  
D i f f i c u l t y  f a l l ing  asleep? 1 2 3 4 5 Difficulty arising? 1 2 3 4 5 
How deep w a s  your sleep? 1 2 3 4 5 How rested you f e e l ?  1 2 3 4 5 
Please answer t h e  fo l lowing  items about how you f e e l  t i g h t  now. 
Place a mark on t h e  l i n e  a t  t h e  p o i n t  which best corresponds t o  your 
presen t  s t a t e  of a l e r t n e s s .  




1) COMMAND: a specific assignment of responsibility by one group member to 
another. 
2) OBSERVATION: recognizing and/or noting a fact or occurrence relating to 
the task. 
3) SUGGESTION: recommendation for a specific course of action. 
4) STATEMENT OF INTENT: announcement of an intended action by 
speaker. Includes statements referring to present and future actions, but not to 
previous actions. 
5 )  INQUIRY: a request for factual information relating to the task. Not a 
request for action. 
6) AGREEMENT: a response in concurrence with a previous speech act; a posi- 
tive evaluation of a prior speech act. 
7) DISAGREEMENT: a response NOT in concurrence with a previous speech 
act; a negative evaluation of a prior speech act. 
8 )  a) makes known that a prior speech act was 
heard; b) does not supply additional information; c )  does not evaluate a previ- 
ous speech act. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT: 
9) ANSWER SUPPLYING INFORMATION: speech act supplying information 
beyond mere agreement, disagreement, or acknowledgment. 
10) RESPONSE UNCERTAINTY: statement indicating uncertainty or lack of 
information with which to respond to a speech act. 
11) TENSION RELEASE: laughter or humorous remark. 
12) FRUSTRATION/ANGER/DERISIVE COMMENT: statement of displeas- 
ure with self, other persons, or some aspect of the task; or a ridiculing remark. 
13) EMBARRASSMENT: any comment apologizing for an incorrect response, 
etc. 
59 
14) REPEAT: restatement of a previous speech act without prompting. 
15) CHECKLIST: prompts and replies to items on a checklist. 
16) NON-TASK RELATED: any speech act referring to something other than 
the present task. 
17) NON-CODABLE: speech act which in unintelligible or unclassifiable with 
respect to the present coding scheme. 
18) ATC COMMUNICATION: any communication over the radio with ATC, 
dispatch, "the company", etc. 
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PAGE Is 
- - D&Tt  A N m M h :  1/ JUL l Y t f 4  -.- --- - 
APPENDIX F 
OF POOR O U A L ~ ~  
SAMPLE AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE DATA 
ISKKXIWAmD-TTFIt: 1/ - JUL - 1 Y 8 4  20' 
A I RSPEED: 277 .03380  ~ E i + i h E :  19023. 11 
E N G . # l  EPR: 1.812 VOR/LOC DEV: 0. 135 
GEAR - P 0 3 ~ r - - -  6~00000---- -€ME-SEC. ; 
# 1  NAV FREQ.: 110400 # l  DME: 117 
D A l t  A N m t :  17 - JUL - 1 Y U 4  20' 
ENG.#l  EPR: 1 .553  VOR/LOC DEV: 0. 141  
G / S  DEV 8.0000000 FLAP DEGREES, 0.000 
GEAR POSF---- - - . -0. 00000 ---- - TIME-9ECn---1--68914r7Bd 
AIRSPEED: 280 .84479  AiYI3i jDE: 18998. 43  
MAC. -HEADINCt. -51,12605---- .-VERT,-SPEED: 81-9 --- 
ENG.#l  EPR: 1 .555  VORILOC DEV: 0. 052  
G / S  DEV 8.0000000 FLAP DEGREES: 0.000 
- MAC, -HEADINCr 93.- ;L002?--VERLSPEEL ? 7 - ? - h  
G / S  DEV 8.0000000 FLAP DEQREES: ;se9;?~m-------~ 0 000 
A I RSPEED: 280.26279 At?. 19028. 15 I 
- -  
MAC. -HEADINC:---48lOQbS -YERT,-SPEED: - 522-4 -- 1 
tti NAV FREQ. : 1 10400 #1 DME: 102 
- - 
i 
GEAR POS----- 0.  OOOOO----- - T I: ME--SEC T:- ~ x ~ - m - - - -  
#l NAV FREQ.: 110400 # l  DME: e 5  I 
- - D m T M t :  1 I  JUL 1 Y H 4  20. -----.- 
ISATE7ilUlJTTPIET 
A I RSPEED: 
MAC,---MEADINC; 
ENG.#l  EPR: 
G / S  DEV 
G€AF?-PO97-- 
u i  NAV F R ~ Q . :  
- JUL-l9B4-2U:453b 
282. 92468 ALTITUDE: 18985. 18 
1 . 5 5 4  VOR/LOC DEV: 0.053 
8.0000000 FLAP DEGREES:' 0.000 
- --a: 00000---- TIME-SEtk . 
1 10400 A 1  DME: 
1 
51, 75150 VERT,-SPEED; - 1 2 2 L - 1  
68944~  70--- 
D A T E m n - J U L  - 1 Y 8 4  idU. 
AIRSPEED: 285.85156 A?; i ?-:DE: 18993. 17 
MAC-HEAPINO.-51-3763? - d E R T P E E D :  =Lr 0 
ENG.#1 EPR: 1. 529 VOR/LOC DEV: 0. 113 
8.0000000 FLAP DECREES: 0.000 G/S DEV 
GEAR-POSY-- -0~00000- € M E 9 E C ; T - ~ 9 7 4 :  -70 
tti NAV FREQ. : 1 10400 #1 DME: 37 
---- 
- - 
18996. 4 2  
- D m P I m D t :  11 JUL 1Yt f4  i Z O ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ D E :  
AIRSPEED: 286.68530 
MAC.--MEADINCr ---5L 92190 - U E R T P E E D :  4.S- 
ENG. # l  EPR: 1. 530 VOR/LOC DEV: 0.020 
FLAP DEGREES: 0.000 G/S DEV 8.0000000 
GEAR-POST~- - -  
# 1  NAV FREG. : 114100 01 DME: 97 1 I 
- -  - -  -0; O O O O O - ~  T IM E - ! 3 € C ; ~ - - - - - b 8 9 8 C 7  
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